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PRPLUDE
My topic is framed by a trio of United States Supreme Court deci-
sions:  Boddie v. Connecticut,'  United States v. Kras, 2  and Ortwein v.
Schwab.'
To set the stage, I offer the following phantasmagoria:
Imagine  that the  Supreme  Court  grants petitions for  certiorari  on
the  same  day in  two  cases from  the  same  state.  Each  case  involves
a finance  company's  effort to  repossess from the petitioner  an automo-
bile which the  company  says,  and the petitioner  denies, secures  a valid
defaulted debt owed to the company by the petitioner.
In  case  A,  the  company's  agent  has  himself  taken  away  the
car.  The petitioner,  having  been  warned  that it might be  a criminal
act for him to try to  recapture the car on his own, has  sought to  file a
civil  action  for  conversion  (in which  the  standard  relief  would  be  a
money judgment  for the  car's  value).  He  has  been  turned  away  be-
cause  of  failure to  pay  a  twenty-dollar  filing  fee  which  (according  to
his  uncontradicted  affidavit)  he  had  no  means  of  paying.  He  now
petitions  from  the  state  supreme  court's  judgment  upholding,  against
due process attack, the exclusionary application of the filing fee.
In  case B,  the  car  was  repossessed by  a deputy  sheriff,  acting  at
the  company's  request  under  a prejudgment  replevin  writ.  The  writ
was granted  at a judicial  hearing  of which  petitioner  was  notified  but
from which  he  was excluded  because  of his inability  to pay  a ten-dol-
lar  "appearance  fee."4   Thereafter,  the  petitioner  tried  to file  a  civil
action in  the  state courts,  complaining  of an  unconstitutional  depriva-
tion  of property without due process  of law" under Fuentes v. Shevin. 0
The remedies  sought were  a  decree  ordering return  of the  car pending
1.  401  U.S.  371  (1971).
HEREINAFrER  THE  FOLLOWING  CITATIONS  WILL  BE  USED  IN  THIS
ARTICLE:
R. PosNEa,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF LAw  (1972)  [hereinafter cited  as POSNERJ;
Michelman,  In  Pursuit of  Constitutional Welfare  Rights:  One  View  of  Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 121 U.  PA.  L. Rnv.  962 (1973)  [hereinafter  cited as Michelman].
2.  409 U.S.  434  (1973).
3.  410  U.S.  656  (1973).
4.  Appearance  fees  are  not  imaginary.  See  Silverstein,  Waiver of  Court Costs
and Appointment of Counsel for Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARmAso  L. REv.  21,  41
(1967).
5.  Cf.  Bacon  v.  Graham,  348  F. Supp.  996  (D. Ariz.  1972)  (holding  unconsti-
tutional  requirement  that  respondent  tender  witness  fees  as  condition  of  subpoenaing
witness  in pretermination  welfare  "fair  hearing"  required  by  Goldberg  v.  Kelly,  397
U.S.  254  (1970)  ).
6.  407 U.S.  67  (1972).
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a proper  hearing and  compensation  for the  elapsed  period of  depriva-
tion.  This  action was  repulsed  because  of the petitioner's  inability  to
pay  the twenty-dollar  court filing fee,  and he  now seeks  review  of the
judgment upholding the exclusionary imposition of the latter fee.
Provoked  and inspired  by Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein, we  might
imagine  the  Court  deciding  in favor  of petitioner  B  but  against  peti-
tioner  A,  offering  the  following  reasons  for  the  apparent  disparity  of
treatment:
1.  We first compare the state's  refusal to lend  an ear to A's  conversion
action with its refusal to  allow B's appearance  at the replevin  hear-
ing.  We  conclude  that B's  due  process  rights  were  violated,  but
not  A's.  The  principal  ground  for  these  differing  conclusions  is
that B was  made  a defendant,  whereas  A  sought  to be  a  plaintiff.
This difference is determinative for the following reasons:
(a)  As  a defendant,  B had  no possible way  of protecting  his
interest  in his car  except to  appear  and  defend  in the re-
plevin action.  (We  note  that B  has  a constitutionally  cog-
nizable  interest  in  avoiding  even  temporary  disposses-
sion  of his  car  pending  final  judgment  on  the  merits  in
the  replevin  action.7)  A,  by  way  of  contrast,  possibly
could  have  terminated-or  even  entirely  avoided-loss
of  possession  of  his  car,  and  could  have  secured  at  least
partial  recompense  for  any  temporary  deprivation,  by
remonstrating  with the  company's  agent  or,  perhaps,  by
offering to pay ("settle") for the car's return.8
(b)  When B was  forced  to  default  by the  "appearance  fee,"
there  issued  a  judicial  writ  which,  if  valid,  would  have
barred  him forever  after  from legal  recourse to vindicate
his claimed  right to the car during the period of the  dep-
uty's impoundment.9  A,  on the other  hand, has  suffered
a  merely  temporary  frustration.  As  soon  as  he  raises
enough  money  to  pay  the  filing  fee,  he  can  have  his
7.  See  Fuentes  v. Shevin,  407 U.S.  67  (1972).  The  Court in  Fuentes evidently
meant that a person has a protected  claim to  actual possession  of his asset through any
given period  of  time  and  not  just  a  claim to  the  monetary  equivalent  value  of  such
possession,  for the Pennsylvania  statute invalidated  in Fuentes assured  compensation  for
any  temporary  dispossession  found  unjustified  after  full  trial  on  the  merits.  See  id.
at 75 n.7,  81-82, 85-86; PosNR  275-76.
8.  This "difference"  in  the  situations  of  defendants  and  plaintiffs  is  discussed  at
text accompanying  notes  100-05 infra.
9.  This  conclusion assumes that the prejudgment replevin  writ would  be given  res
judicata  effect  as to  the  right  of possession  during  the  period  between  initial  seizure
and adjudication on the merits.  Such was  apparently not the fact in Fuentes.  See note
7 supra.
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claims  tested in  court;  and,  if he  prevails,  he  can secure
both retrospective  and prospective relief.' 0
(c)  The state excluded  B  from the  litigation  forum just when
there  impended  an  act  (the  deputy's  repossession)  which
would be  a direct and  immediate  violation of B's property
rights  if  B's  claim  were  sound.  But  A,  even  assuming
his  claim  to  be  sound,  has  merely  been  excluded  from
seeking  compensation  for  a violation  of  his rights  already
committed  by the  time  the  fee  controversy  arose.  Pre-
venting  violations  is  more  important  than  compensating
for violations already committed.11
(d)  In B's  case,  the  state was  threatening  to  commit  an  ac-
tive violation of B's rights; however,  in A's case, the state's
role  was  the  merely  passive  one  of  not  assisting  A  in
gaining  requital  for  the  company's  supposed  violation  of
his  rights.  The  due  process  guaranty  is  concerned  with
state  behavior, and  active  violation  by  the  state  is  con-
sidered  worse  than  a  mere  passive  failure  to  give  pro-
tection against violations by others.12
(e)  Moreover,  we  cannot  infer from  the mere  fact  that  state
law recognizes  a civil cause of action, such as that for con-
version,  that  a  corresponding  personal  right is  thereby
accorded to the victim-plaintiff.  For  all we  can  tell,  the
state,  by creating  the  cause  of  action,  intends  merely  to
enlist  the victim's  aid in  a  general  program  for  deterring
behavior  which  is  socially  undesirable.  If  so,  why  may
not the state  use filing fees  as  a  device for  screening  out
cases  of  marginal  significance?  On  the  other  hand,  it
is  unambiguously  clear  (despite  the  state's  willingness
to  exclude B  by insisting  on  the  "appearance  fee")  that
the  interests  which  defendants  have  at  stake  in  lawsuits
are  true personal  rights  for  which  their  holders  may  de-
mand respect and protection.' 3
2.  We  are now in  a position to  compare the imposition  of  a filing  fee
10.  "Prospective  relief"  would  consist  of  a money  judgment  for  the  value  of  the
car.  "Retrospective  relief" would  consist  of  interest  on that  amount from  the  date of
the  tortious  taking.  The  "finality"  notion  is  discussed  at  text  accompanying  notes
106-14 infra.
11.  For possible  distinctions  between  preventive  and  compensatory  relief  and  be-
tween  primary  and  secondary  (remedial)  rights,  see  text  accompanying  notes  128-38
infra.
12.  For discussion of the question of an active  state role  vis-h-vis a passive one,  see
text accompanying notes  139-50 infra.
13.  For an  exploration  of  the notion  of rightless  litigants,  see  text  accompanying
notes  116-20  infra.
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in B's  civil  action  with  the  similar  imposition  in A's  civil  action.
We  recognize that B has now become  a plaintiff, so  that in certain
respects his situation resembles  A's, viz.:  (a)  B  could possibly  get
his  car back,  and even  secure  compensation  for the  period  of  dep-
rivation,  by  remonstrating  with  the  deputy  (or,  perhaps,  the  gov-
ernor  or legislature of the state)  and with the company.  (b)  Even
if  that  does  not  work,  B  has  suffered  a  merely  temporary  hin-
drance to his  lawsuit.  As  soon  as  he  can raise  twenty  dollars  for
the  filing  fee  he  can  proceed.  (c)  In  part,  B  is  seeking  merely
compensatory relief.  But B's case  differs  from A's  in the following
crucial respects:
(a)  Insofar  as  B  is  seeking  preventive  relief,  his  quest  is
more important than A's  prayer  for  monetary  compensa-
tion.
(b)  Even  more  significantly,  B  sues  to  vindicate  a  "constitu-
tional  right"  or  "fundamental  interest"  (i.e.,  not  to
have  the state  take  away  his  car  without  first  affording
him due  process of  law),  whereas  A  complains  merely  of
violation of his  common-law  right not to have his posses-
sions  involuntarily  molested.  Having  your  constitutional
rights  violated  must  be  deemed  worse  than  having  your
common-law rights violated;  or,  at any rate, violations  of
constitutional  rights must be  deemed  to  give you  a more
compelling claim to court access. 14
(e)  While it is  true that B  could  possibly  gain  satisfaction  of
his  interests  through  extrajudicial  negotiations  with  the
state  government,  the  need  for  court  access  is  more  ur-
gent  where  the  only  alternative  is  inducing  the  govern-
ment to  grant  an  acceptable  settlement  than  where  it  is
merely a private adversary who must be convinced. 15
Now I  should be  the  last to  deny  the  somewhat  stupefying  char-
acter  of my  little fantasy.  Taken  as  a  whole,  the points  offered  may
stir in  some readers an  acute sense of ire and bafflement.  I  think one
14.  For  an  examination  of  this  proposition,  see  text accompanying  notes  159-86
infra.
15.  It  is  unclear  whether  the  "monopolization"  of  relief  deemed  important  in
Boddie and Kras was  monopolization  by  the judiciary  or monopolization  by  the  gov-
ernment  as  a whole  (where  the only alternative  to judicial  relief is  a governmental  con-
cession).  See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85  HAiv. L. REv. 40,  107  n.18  (1971).
See  also LaFrance, Constitutional  Law Reform  For the Poor: Boddie  v.  Connecticut,
1971  DuKE  L.L  487,  534-36;  Note,  Indigent Access  to  Civil Courts:  The  Tiger Is at
the Gates, 26  VAND.  L.  REv.  25,  46-47  (1973).  That  the  Ortwein  opinion  does  not
cite  appellants'  opportunity  to  negotiate  with  the  welfare  officials  as  an  alternative
avenue  to  relief  (see  text  accompanying  note  33  infra) may  perhaps  be  taken  as  sug-
gesting the latter interpretation.
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can  be precise  about  at  least  some  of  the  causes.  In the first place,
some of the distinctions  drawn appear to contradict those taken at other
points  in  the  same  story.'6  But  more  fundamentally,  premises  are
stated or implied which simply  do  not square  with  ordinary  and  tradi-
tional  perceptions  and  feelings  about  the purpose  and  meaning  of le-
gal  rights  and  lawsuits,  or which  take  a hard  position on  some  deep,
earnestly  disputed,  and  perhaps  irresolvable  sociological  or  jurispru-
dential issue.'
7
I  cannot  pretend  to  know  with  certainty  whether  the  Supreme
Court  would  actually  endorse  all  the  points  advanced  in  my  story.
I  do know  (at least  my  reason  tells  me) that the  Court  subscribes  to
some  of these  points,  because belief  in some  subset  of the  whole  col-
lection  is  logically  implied  by  the  Court's  holdings  and  seriously  in-
tended dicta in the three decisions we are to examine.
A.  Tim AccEss  FEE DECISIONS  AND WHAT IS WRONG  WITH THEm
In  the  Boddie  case,  the  Court,  speaking  through  Justice  Har-
lan, held that Connecticut denied due process of law to persons wishing
in good  faith to  sue  for  divorce  but unable  to pay  the  approximately
sixty  dollars  in filing  fees  and process-serving  fees  demanded  by  the
state  as  a  condition  of  allowing  the  suit.  For  my  purposes  here,  I
shall  presume  to rearrange  slightly the order  of reasons  given for this
conclusion:
(1)  "Prior  cases  establish  . . . that  due  process  requires,  at  a
minimum,  that absent  a  countervailing  state interest  of overriding  sig-
nificance,  persons  forced  to  settle  their  claims  of  right  and  duty
through  the  judicial  process  must  be  given  a  meaningful  opportunity
to be heard.""'
(2)  Claims  based  on  this  principle  have  typically  been  pressed
by  defendants.  The  reason  is  that  defendants  always  can,  while
plaintiffs  usually  cannot,  claim  to  be  in  the  position  of  having  been
"forced to settle their claims"  in court.  But in this respect  a potential
divorce  plaintiff  is  like  a  defendant,  because  without  a judicial  pro-
ceeding a divorce is, literally and absolutely, unobtainable.
(3)  The  relief,  a  change  in  marital  status,  which  petitioners
are  "forced"  to  seek  through  the  judicial  process  (in the  sense  that it
is not obtainable in any other way),  "involves  interests  of basic  impor-
16.  Compare  the  treatments  of  temporary  deprivation  in  points  l(a)  and  1(b).
Consider also the internal contradiction  in point  1  (e).
17.  See points I(c),  I(d), 1(e), 2(b).
18.  401  U.S.  at 377.
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tance  in  our society,"'19  as  is indicated  by  prior  decisions  recognizing
constitutional  protection  for  interests  in  free  choice  of  marital  part-
ners,20  procreation,2' and the raising of children.2
(4)  "Our  cases  further  established  that  a  statute  or rule  may
be  held constitutionally  invalid  as  applied  when it operates  to deprive
an  individual  of  a  protected  right  although  its  general  validity  . . .
is  beyond  question."23   In  particular,  "a  cost  requirement,  valid  on
its face, may offend due process  because it operates to foreclose  a par-
ticular  party's  opportunity  to  be  heard. '24   The  fee  requirements
had such an effect here.
(5)  None  of  the  justifications  advanced  by  the  state  for  appli-
cation  of  its  fee  requirement  to  indigent,  would-be  divorce  suitors  is
sufficient  to  override  the  due  process  rights  of  those  suitors.  (The
unsuccessfully  claimed  justifications  included  "the  prevention  of  friv-
olous  litigation  . . . [and  the]  use  of  court  fees  and  process  costs  to
allocate scarce resources.")
2 5
The  Kras case  involved  an  indigent  petitioner  seeking  a  bank-
ruptcy  discharge.  According  to  his  uncontested  affidavit,  the  peti-
tioner's  financial  situation was  such that he was  "wholly unable to pay
or  promise  to  pay  the  [fifty-dollar]  filing  fees,  even  in  small  install-
ments  [as  permitted  by  the  statute]  . . . and  also  provide  [himself]
and  [his]  dependents  with  day-to-day  necessities." 26   The  Court  held
that  refusing Kras  access  to  the  bankruptcy  court under  these  circum-
stances  did not violate  his rights  under the fifth  amendment  due proc-
ess clause.  The obvious problem  for the opinion writer,  Justice Black-
mun, was to distinguish  Boddie.  The principal points made  in this  ef-
fort were the following:
(1)  It is  legally  impossible  to  secure  a  divorce  except  through
a  judicial  proceeding.  An  out-of-court  settlement  by  the  parties  will
not dissolve  the  legal bond  of marriage  and thereby  relieve  the parties
of  various  special  duties  and  liabilities.  By  contrast,  relief  from the
claims  of creditors  is  in principle  available  through  a negotiated  com-
19. Id. at 376.
20.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21.  Skinner v. Oklahoma,  316 U.S. 535  (1942).
22.  Meyer v. Nebraska,  262 U.S.  390 (1923).
23.  401 U.S.  at  379.
24.  Id.  at 380.
25.  Id. at  381.  The  asserted  and  conceivable  economic  justifications  for  court
access fees will be discussed in Part II, the sequel to this Article.
26.  409  U.S.  at  454  n.6  (dissenting  opinion  of  Stewart,  J.)  (quoting  appellee's
affidavit).  Justice  Blackmun's  opinion  for  the  Court,  id. at 449,  evinces  a  skeptical
view of this uncontested  avowal.
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position,  "however  unrealistic  the  remedy  may  be  in  a particular  sit-
uation.
27
(2)  Kras'  interest  in  obtaining  a  bankruptcy  discharge  "does
not  rise to  the  same  constitutional  level"28  as  that of the  Boddie peti-
tioners  in securing  divorces.  Inability  to  dissolve  one's marriage  seri-
ously  impairs  exercise  of  constitutionally  protected  associational  in-
terests.  But  there  is  no  constitutional  right  to  a  bankruptcy  dis-
charge,  nor  is  the  interest  in  obtaining  one  to  be  classed  as  "funda-
mental"  so  as  to  require  the  government  to  cite  "compelling"  inter-
ests  to justify any  special or "unequal"  impediments  it casts in the way
of individuals seeking to realize that interest.29
(3)  There  is  an  apparent  rational  basis  for  the  filing  fee-
namely,  to  make  the  system  of  bankruptcy  referees  self-sustaining
through  charges  imposed  on  the  system's  users  rather  than  through
taxes on the public at large.
In the Ortwein case,  the  appellants  were  welfare  recipients  whose
benefits  had  been  reduced  by  county  welfare  agencies  on  grounds
challenged  by  appellants both  in law  and  in fact.  The  disputed  cuts
had  mainly  been  upheld  by  the  state  Public  Welfare  Division  after  a
hearing  held  at the  request  of  appellants.  Appellants  then  sought ju-
dicial review  in the  Oregon  Court of Appeals,  where  general  jurisdic-
tion  was  lodged  to  review  decisions  of  state  administrative  agencies.
Review  was  denied  for  the  sole  reason  that  appellants  failed  to  pay
the  standard  twenty-five-dollar  filing  fee. 8 0  They  had  alleged  with-
out  contradiction  their  inability  to pay.  The  denial of  review was  af-
firmed by the Oregon Supreme  Court and, on the appeal papers without
full  briefs  and  arguments,  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.
The  Court's  memorandum  opinion  made  various  points,  includ-
ing the following:
(1)  The  appellants'  interest  in  increased  welfare  payments  is
not  "fundamental. 831   It  "has  far  less  constitutional  significance""2
27.  Id. at 445.
28.  Id.
29.  Id. at  446.  The  impediment  involved  in Kras and  the  other  cases  here  con-
sidered-a flat fee applicable  to all  members of a genuine class  of would-be  litigants-is
not "unequal"  in the most straightforward  sense  of that term.  However, the  Court has
on certain  occasions regarded as "unequal"  the  selective effects  of flat fees  in completely
excluding  the  "functionally  indigent"  from  governmentally  provided  benefits  available
to all  who can afford the fees.  This notion of inequality  is considered in Part II.
30.  This fee was required  of all persons seeking to become moving parties  (normally
as "appellants")  in the Court of Appeals.  See 410 U.S. at 658.
31.  Id. at 659.
32.  Id.
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than  the Boddie appellants'  interest in divorce with its  associational  af-
finities.
(2)  As  in  Kras but  not  in  Boddie, appellants  in  Ortwein had
an  alternative  recourse  "not  conditioned  on  the  payment  of  the
fees."' 3  The  alternative  named by  the  Court was not,  as might have
been  expected,  negotiation  and  out-of-court  settlement with  the  coun-
ty  welfare  agency.  Rather  it  was  the  administrative  hearing  that
had in fact been  afforded  by  the  state  Public  Welfare  Division.  The
Court's meaning is  not entirely  clear, but it seems  to have been equat-
ing  the  administrative  appeal  with  a  trial-level  judicial-review  pro-
ceeding.  Thus,  the  appellants'  request  for  judicial  review  would  be
analogous to one for an appeal.
(3)  The  filing-fee  requirement,  again,  has  a  rational  justifi-
cation  that  is  apparent:  it "produces  some  small  revenue  to  assist  in
offsetting" the costs of operating "the Oregon court system."34
In retrospect  it seems that Boddie contained  a basic methodologi-
cal  ambivalence,  which  Kras and Ortwein have  since  resolved.  By
anchoring  his  reasoning  in Boddie to  what he  saw  as  the  established
procedural  rights  of  defendants,  Justice  Harlan  invited  speculation
that  the  Supreme  Court might be  in the process  of  evolving  a general
theory  of  constitutional  protection  for  effective  access  to  court-that
the  Court might be  regarding  a  person's  interest in judicial  accessibil-
ity  itself  as  one  of those  values  whose  realization  the  Constitution  has
placed  within  the  special  keeping  of reviewing  courts.35  Recognition
of  constitutional  protection  for  such  an  interest  would  not  necessarily
be  contradicted  by conditioning  judicial protection  for it in a particu-
lar case  on the  presence  of a  genuine  or substantial  need for relief, or
on  the  absence  of  easily  available  alternative  avenues  to  effective
relief.  On  the  other  hand,  the  opinion's  emphasis  on  the  absolute
lack  of such  alternatives  and on the fundamental or  constitutional im-
portance  of  the  relief  sought,  might  have  suggested  that  the  Court
was  developing  a  quite  different focus-that  it might be restricting  its
concern  to the interest particularly  to  be vindicated  through the  litiga-
tion at hand and might not be  attending to  any broader interest in liti-
gation access  as such.  Perhaps  it was  only the interest particularly  to
be  vindicated,  and  no  other,  that  excited  the  Courts  due  process
33.  Id.
34.  Id. at 660.
35.  This  was  the  prognosis  offered  by  one  commentator.  See  LaFrance,  supra
note 15,  at 536-37.
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sensitivities;  and  it  was  only  because,  under  the  circumstances,  the
denial  of  court  access  was  an  unacceptable  hindrance  to  the  reali-
zation  of  that interest  that the  denial  of  access  was  held  unconstitu-
tional.
Whatever  ambiguities  may  have been  latent  in  the Boddie opin-
ion  have  been  resolved  by  the  opinions  in  Kras and Ortwein.  The
Court  has made  plain  its view  that an  indigent,  would-be  civil  plain-
tiff  must appeal  to  the  interest  at stake in  a particular litigation,  and
not to  a general  interest  in ability  to  litigate,  in any  effort  to  invoke
constitutional protection  against an exclusionary30  court-access  fee.  A
basic thesis of my essay is that the Court has erred in choosing to focus
on the "interest" question rather than on the "access" question.
This  Article  is  the  first  part  of  a  two-part  essay.  In  Part  I, I
shall try to  show that the Court's effort to  distinguish between  civil-de-
fendant  and  civil-plaintiff  situations,  and  to  differentiate  among  vari-
ous plaintiff situations on the basis of the interests particularly  at stake,
has  led  the  Court  to  rely  on  propositions  which  cannot  be  sup-
ported  by  appeal  either  directly  to  any  constitutional  text  or  medi-
ately  through  any  general  principle  which  is  persuasive  in itself,  let
alone  persuasively  inferred  from  the  Constitution.  The  more  perse-
veringly  one  tries  to  make  the  Court's  distinctions  seem  persua-
sive,  the  more  those  distinctions  turn  out  to  entail  surprising  resolu-
tions  of  certain  major,  deep-lying,  controversial,  and  perhaps  unre-
solvable  questions  of jurisprudential  and  political  theory  and  of legal
sociology.  There  is no  way  of being  sure whether  the  Court noticed
these problems  or whether it meant to decide them.  There  is a  ques-
tion  whether  such  issues  are  even  susceptible  of  judicial  "decision."
All  the  foregoing,  even  if  established,  is  not  by  itself  proof  of
a further thesis:  that the Court would have  done better to acknowledge
the  question  of a general  right  of judicial  access  than  to  worry  about
what litigation  stakes under what  circumstances  amount  in  themselves
to constitutionally protected interests.  To show that the Court's attempts
to differentiate between defendants  and plaintiffs, or between "monopo-
36.  In this Article I shall use the word  "exclusionary"  to  mean  the effect of  a fee
on  a person  who  is functionally  indigent-who  does  not pay  the fee  when  he  cannot
pay it without depriving himself  or his  dependents  of  the  day-to-day  necessities  of life.
See  generally San  Antonio  Independent  School  Dist.  v.  Rodriguez,  411  U.S.  1,  19
(1973).  This  definition  of,  indigency  (though  not  the  label  "functionally  indigent")
was  used  in  Boddie  and Kras, and  may  be  traceable  to  an  earlier  decision  holding
that  a  person  need  not  be  "wholly  destitute"  in  order  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  the
federal  statute  allowing  court  appearances  in  forma  pauperis.  See  Adkins  v.  E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.  331,  339-40  (1948).
1162 [Vol.  1973:1153LITIGATION  ACCESS  FEES
lized" or "constitutional"  plaintiffs and other plaintiffs, lead back to un-
tenable premises does not exclude the possibility that there is  no protec-
tion for judicial access  (or none in civil cases),  no matter what may be at
stake.  Yet  as I  shall try to show  in Part II,  which will be  published
at a later date, recognition  of a general  constitutional  right of judicial
access  would  harmonize  with  persuasive  principle,  traditional  under-
standings, and developed constitutional doctrine,  and would not be open
to any really convincing objection.
B.  WHAT IS AT  STAKE:  SOME  COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL  ROLE
Why  all  this ruckus  about such  a pipsqueak  issue  as  court access
fees?  After  all,  the  practical importance  of the fees  is probably  small.
The number  of persons  who  are  genuinely  excluded  by the fees-who
cannot  pay  them  without  foregoing  life's  necessities-may  not  be
great.  And even  as  to  those persons,  the fee problem  is  partially  ob-
viated in the federal  and many  state judicial  systems by a more-or-less
generously  administered  in  forma  pauperis  practice. 87  Advances  by
lawyers working  on contingent-fee  contracts  and the  activities  of legal-
aid  and  public-interest  law  organizations  take  care  of  some  of  the
remaining  problems.  By  any  practical  measure,  it  is  not  primarily
the  fees  imposed  by states  as  a legal  condition  of access to court  (the
subject  of this  essay)18  that impede  effective  litigation  by  the impov-
erished,  but  the far  heavier  costs  of  the  legally  optional,  yet  practi-
cally  essential,  equipage  often  needed  for  an  effective  presentation
once  the  case  is  filed-attorneys'  fees,  chiefly,  but  consultant,  expert
witness,  investigational,  stenographic,  and  printing  costs  as  well.  In-
deed,  this  comparison  of  access  fees  with  equipage  costs  suggests  a
rationale  for  the  Court's  inhospitable  attitude  toward  claims  for  ac-
cess-fee relief-a rationale perhaps more persuasive than anything found
in the Court's opinions.
Consider  this  line  of  argument:  The  access-fee  question,  pre-
cisely  because  it is  short  on practical  significance,  is highly tokenistic.
Invalidating  a  filing  fee  while  announcing  constitutional  protection
for the right to litigate would  be a hollow  gesture in the  absence  of a
fixed  intention  to  grant  future  judicial  relief  in  the  really  important
context  of  equipage-so  hollow,  indeed  so hypocritical,  as  to  deserve
37.  See 28  U.S.C.  § 1915(a)  (1970);  Adkins  v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S.  331  (1948);  Silverstein, supra note 4, at 3349.
38.  State-imposed  access  fees  include  not  only  filing  fees  but  all  payments,
whether to state  officials or others  (such  as process-servers,  stenographers,  printers,  or
bondsmen),  for the  privilege  of  access  itself  or for  goods  or services  that  are  a  legal
condition of  access.
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the  epithet  "unprincipled."  A promise  of judicial  relief for the  equip-
age  problems  of  impoverished  civil  litigants  would,  at  any  rate,  be
read  into  the  invalidation  of  access  fees.  But  that  promise  is  one
which  the  Court cannot  and  should not try  to keep,  because  it would
contort  the  judicial  role unduly.  The ultimate  outcome  of  the  whole
adventure,  then,  would  probably  be  damage  to  the  Court's  reputa-
tion for  integrity  and  principled  decision-making,  without  any  signifi-
cant  improvement  in  the  situation  of  impecunious,  would-be  liti-
gants.
3 9
That line of  defense, while  tempting, will not work.  The reasons
why it fails  are just  the reasons  why this  essay is worth  writing.  The
most  important  failing  is  that  the  Court's  opinions  do  not  accord
with  the suggested  rationale.  Confronted  with the Kras case  on direct
appeal,40  the Court had no choice but to affirm or reverse.  The Court
might  have  denied  Kras  judicial  relief  and  explained  the  denial  in
terms  of concerns  about judicial  role.  But that  is not what the Court
did.  Far from sidestepping  the question  of a right to litigate  out of  a
fear  that  to  confront  the  question  would  be  to  grant  the  right  and
then to be swept on by such a decision to a point where no court ought
to go,  the Court confronted  the question  and concluded  that there was
no right.  In  support  of that  conclusion,  the  Court  tendered  reasons.
Those  reasons,  in  turn,  have  logical  entailments.  Inasmuch  as  the
Court  is  supposed  to  act  according  to  principle,  those  entailments
aspire  to  the  status  of  doctrinal  principle.  They  are  not  self-evi-
dent,  and  I  believe  that  when  revealed  they  will  surprise  and,  per-
haps,  alarm.  To  reveal  them  (let  them  alarm  whom  they  will)  is
one of my purposes.
Moreover,  it may  not  be  true  that  the  practical  import  of  the
Supreme  Court's  rejection,  in  the  fee  cases,  of  the  litigation-right
proposition  is  merely  that the  Court  and  lower  federal  tribunals  will
continue  to refrain  from providing  judicial  relief  against  filing  fees  in
the  handful  of  cases  where  fees  have  exclusionary  effect.  There  has
long  been  developing  in our  country,  and  there  is  perhaps  now  com-
ing  to  a head,  a political  debate  about the proper legislative  response
to  those  other,  more  important  impediments  to  effective  litigation
which I have  termed  "equipage."  It may be  true that these  expenses
are not imposed by the  state, at least not in the most direct sense,  and
39.  Professor  LaFrance  reports  that  the problem  of  drawing  the  line  between  ac-
cess fees and equipage  troubled the District Court in Boddie.  LaFrance, supra note  15,
at 510.
40.  See 28 U.S.C. §  1252  (1970).
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that underwriting  their  costs  entails  affirmative  legislative  actions  that
courts  perhaps  cannot  prudently  and  properly  undertake  to  demand.
Yet  an  explicit  assertion  by  the Supreme  Court  that  the Constitution
means to  protect  claims  to  effective  court access-that  such  access  is
what  is  loosely  called  a  "constitutional  right,"  whether  or  not  the
right is  judicially  enforceable  to  the farthest  limit  of  its logic-might
well have influenced  the legislative  debate regarding legal services,  just
as the Court's apparent acceptance  of the opposite conclusion  may con-
ceivably be influencing that debate in the opposite sense. 1
But  let  me  be  forthright.  I  really  do  not  mean  to  argue  for
the merely hypothetical  proposition that if the Court was going to de-
cide  the  access-fee  issue  on the  merits,  then it should  have  come  out
the  other way (or at least had more  defensible  reasons  for the conclu-
sion it reached).  Nor am I  quite persuaded that the equipage problem
is  off-limits to the Court.  I believe that the Court ought to have decid-
ed the fee question on the merits;  that it ought to have decided  against
the  constitutionality  of  exclusionary  court  access  fees;  that this would
have  been  the  principled  course  to  take  even  were  the  Court  quite
convinced  that  it  could  never  properly  undertake  to  command  the
states  to  alleviate  the  equipage  problems  of  impoverished  litigants;
and, finally,  that the  question of the  Court's power  to order the states
to  provide  equipage  is  difficult  enough  that  the  Court  should  have
been willing to reserve its judgment  until actual cases both necessitated
and provided a context for decision.
My views  on the  merits  of  the fee issue  I  shall  defend  at length
below.  I  shall  merely  state  here,  and  leave  it  for  the  reader  to
verify  (or  falsify)  my  statement,  that  in  principle  those  views  argue
also for the right of at least some impecunious,  would-be litigants  to be
provided  at  state  expense  with  counsel  and other  practical necessities
of  effective  litigation.42  More  particularly,  my  arguments  against
41.  It  is not my  contention  that  the  Court ought  to select  its  cases,  or formulate
its  opinions,  for  the  specific  purpose  of  recognizing  constitutional  rights  in  order  to
influence  legislative  debate.  I  do  suggest  that  the  Court  ought to  act  on  the  under-
standing  that  whatever  it  does  say  about  constitutional  rights-including  the  reasons,
doctrinal  and moral,  that  it offers  in  support of  such  declarations-may  in  fact influ-
ence  legislative activity;  and,  indeed,  that  it is  an important part  of the Court's  job to
make  the kinds  of declarations  that  can exert  such influence  when  the  context  is  suit-
able and the legal merits clear.  Cf. Michelman  997-98,  1002-03,  1015.
42.  The need  for equipage  turns  on a number  of  variables,  including  the  litigant's
personal  capabilities,  the  complexity  of  the  case,  and  the  role  assigned  to  the  judge.
No  doubt there  are  some  indigent  litigants  who  would  not  require  further  assistance
once  the  fee barriers  were  down  and  the  litigants  were  in  the  judicial  presence.  It
seems  equally clear  that for other indigent litigants,  mere admission  to the courthouse,
without provision of  equipage,  will lack practical significance.  Whether lines  are to be
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the  Supreme  Court's  differentiation  of  civil  plaintiffs  in general  from
civil  defendants  in  general-protecting  the  latter  but  not  the  former
group  from  exclusionary  access  fees-seem  also  applicable  to  a like
general  differentiation  with  regard  to  claimed  rights  to  counsel  at
state  expense.  That  is,  I  ask  the  reader  to  consider  whether,  in the
analogic  light of  the  arguments  I  make  below,  it would be justifiable
to rule that indigent civil  defendants  have a due process right to state-
provided  lawyers  while  civil  plaintiffs  have not  that right.  The  ques-
tion  has  some  actual  significance  insofar  as  there  are  already  signs
of judicial  recognition  of  civil  defendants'  right  to  counsel.43  If  my
arguments  are correct,  either  this development  should be nipped  in the
bud,  or the  courts participating  in it should steel  themselves  to extend
it to the plaintiffs' side.
The  argument  I  earlier  suggested  for  the  Court's  refusing  to in-
validate  exclusionary  access  fees rested  in part on the suggestion  that
the  second  of  those  alternatives-judicial  enforcement  of  a  civil
plaintiff's  right  to  counsel-was  out  of  the  question  because  of its
incompatibility  with  a proper  judicial  role.  Now  it certainly  is  true
that  from  an  institutional  standpoint  it is  far  easier  to  contemplate
judicial  relief from  access  fees  than from inability to  afford  equipage.
Judicial  relief  from  access  fees  can  always  take  a  traditional,  strictly
"negative"  form  of ordering  the state  to  dispense  with  some  legal re-
quirement  it would  otherwise  impose.  But judicial  relief  from  equip-
age  costs  must,  most  clearly  for  civil  plaintiffs  but  as  well  for  civil
defendants,  take  the  "affirmative"  form  of  requiring  the  state  to  un-
dertake  some  combination  of subsidizing  the  indigent's litigation  costs
and  substantially  restructuring  its  judicial  system. 44  Although  a wide
drawn,  where,  and  by what  standards  and processes,  are  just the  questions  whose  ex-
istence bespeaks  a  cautious,  case-by-case  approach  to  the problem  of  equipage  in civil
litigation.  See  notes  45-46  infra.  But  the  Supreme  Court's  fee  decisions  have  vir-
tually shut the  door against any judicial  approach  to the problem  of equipage  for  civil
plaintiffs, except  for those  cases  (if  there are any  in addition  to divorce  suits)  able  to
slip through the eye of the Kras/Ortwein needle.  I  suppose it  remains possible  that the
Court will  cope  with  the equipage  problem  in civil-defendant  contexts,  and  then,  if  it
has coped successfully, reexamine its stance  regarding plaintiffs.  But denying access-fee
relief to indigent plaintiffs  in the meanwhile is not a necessary part of  such a program.
43.  See In  re Ella B,  30  N.Y.2d  352,  285  N.E.2d 288,  334  N.Y.S.2d  133  (1972)
(child  neglect-custody  proceeding).  But  see  Robinson  v.  Kaufman,  8  Cal.  App.  3d
783,  87 Cal. Rptr.  678  (2d App.  Dist.  1970),  cert. denied, 402  U.S.  954, 964  (1971)
(same issue; opposite result).
44.  The  need  for  affirmative  relief  rather  sharply, distinguishes  the  problem  of
equipage  for  civil  plaintiffs  from  that  of  equipage  for  criminal  defendants.  E.g.,
Douglas  v.  California,  372  U.S.  353  (1963).  While  a  case  like  Douglas in  a  sense
affirmatively  obliges the state  either to subsidize  purchases  of lawyering  services  on  the
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certainly  imaginable  that  a  conscientious  court  would  conclude  that
the  decision  would  place  too  great  a  strain  on  its  competency.
Whether  that would  be  a correct  conclusion  seems  to  depend  in part
on  how  powerful  one  finds  the  arguments  supporting  the  indigent
plaintiffs  right  (in  principle)  to  be  equipped  at  state  expense.
Yet  even  if  it were  a foregone  conclusion  that  judicial  enforce-
ment  of equipage  rights  is  unthinkable,  the  judicial  duty to  invalidate
exclusionary  access  fees  would  remain  unimpaired.  We  imagine  a
judge  convinced  of three  things:  (1)  as  a matter  of substantive  princi-
ple, everyone has the right not to be excluded  from the litigation forum
by  state-imposed  fees;  (2)  the  same  principle  also  shows  that persons
who have gained  access to the litigation forum have the right to be pro-
vided  with  the  requisite  equipage,  at  state  expense  if  one  cannot  af-
ford  it privately;  and  (3)  as  a  matter  of  institutional  principle,  the
court must not undertake enforcement of the second right, though there
is no institutional difficulty in enforcing the first right.
There  seem to  be  two  alternative  courses  that the  judge  can  fol-
low.  On the one hand,  he  can honor the  substantive  principles  estab-
lishing that court access  is  a constitutional right, just up to but not be-
yond  the point where  those  principles  are  thought  to be  overwhelmed
by the other institutional principles  that limit the judicial  role.  On the
other  hand,  the  judge  can  refuse  all  enforcement  of  the  substantive
principles,  even  in  cases  where  the  institutional  principles  are  not
threatened,  in  order  to  obviate  a  "line-drawing"  problem.  Conceiv-
ably  there  is  some  way of  explaining  why  the  second  course  does  not
deserve  to be  called  unprincipled.  But  surely  the first  course  power-
fully  resists  that  epithet.  For it is  widely  thought that  the  kinds  of
principles  that are  supposed  to  govern  judicial  action  come not as  iso-
lated monads but as  complexes or webs  of interrelated principles;  that
however  sovereign  such a complex  may be  with  respect  to the  judge,
none of the component  principles  in the  complex is  sovereign  vis-h-vis
the other principles; that each component  principle  holds its sway in  a
region bounded by the reach  of other principles in its complex;  that  it
is just  the  judge's  job to  determine  the respective  hegemonies  of  the
extended  to  all  litigants,  the  result  might  be  some  saving  in  both  public  and  private
litigation costs.  The same might be true if the state undertook to steer a larger share of
its  legal  controversies  to  tribunals  where  equipage  needs  are  held  under  restraint.
Also  to be  kept in mind  is the possibility that expansion  of the ability  of impoverished
persons to vindicate their legal rights would  effect a saving  in  the social  costs of viola-
tions  thereby  deterred,  a result  which  would  to  some  extent  offset  any  increases  in
total  outlays  on litigation  and related  activities.  For a  general  framework  and  guide
for considering  such  questions,  see  POSNER  ch. 24; Posner, An  Economic Approach  to
Legal Procedure  and Judicial  Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STiums 399  (1973).
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principles  in  cases  of  arguable  overlap;47  and  that  the  judge  acts
"neutrally"  (where  "neutral"  is  the  contrary  of  "unprincipled")  pre-
cisely  insofar  as  he  is  able  to  make  that  determination  conform  to
some  objective  criterion.48  If there  is a complex  which  includes both
"substantive"  principles  establishing  a  right to  litigate  effectively  and
"institutional"  principles  establishing  limits  on  (but  not  totally  ex-
cluding)  judicial  enforcement  of  such  a  right,49  why  may  not  the
judge-why  must  not  the  judge-give  each  body  of  principles  its
due?
PART I: SPECULATIONS ON THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
UNDERPINNINGS  OF  THE  FEE  DECISIONS
A.  THE NATURE AND  MITHOD OF  n  SEAR C
1.  The Object of Search
Let  us  begin  with  a  concise  statement  of what needs  explaining:
it is  an emergent  rule  regarding  claims  by indigent persons  that they
be relieved  of court  access  fees.  The rule  defines  a subgroup  (call it
X)  of  all persons,  such that whenever  a person is within X, that per-
son is denied due process  if he is refused  access  to court because of in-
ability  to  pay  a  state-imposed  fee.  Enlightened  by  Boddie,  Kras,
Ortwein, and a number of prior decisions, we can say that X means any
of the  following:  a defendant  in criminal  proceedings,  a defendant in
civil  proceedings, 0  or  a plaintiff  in civil  proceedings  seeking  vindica-
tion  of  a  constitutionally  favored  or  "fundamental"  interest  where
relief is unobtainable extrajudicially.51
The  challenge  is  to  see  how  this  rule  can  be  persuasively  ex-
plained.  I  do  not  think  it  can  be.  My  counter-thesis  is  that  if X
47.  Cf.  Dworkin,  The  Model  of  Rules,  35  U.  CH.  L.  REV.  14,  34-40  (1967);
Henkin, Foreword: On Drmving Lines, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63,  63-65  (1968).
48.  See Michelman  1015-17.
49.  For  illustration  of  a  complex  including  both  bodies  of  principle,  see  id.  at
991-97.
50.  I know of no case holding that  defendants  may not be excluded  by appearance
fees.  See  notes  4-5  supra  and  accompanying  text.  (Perhaps  no  state  has  ever
insisted  on  payment of  such  a fee when it would  have  been exclusionary.)  The  rea-
soning  of  the  Boddie  opinion  nevertheless  proceeds  from  the  assumption  that  exclu-
sionary  application  of  an  access  fee to a  defendant  would be unconstitutional.  A like
conclusion is strongly suggested  by Fuentes.  See note 7 supra.
51.  At  this  time,  it is  not  perfectly  clear  whether  a  plaintiff  must  show  both  a
favored interest  and a lack of extrajudicial  recourse in order to benefit from the Boddie
ruling, or whether  satisfying one  of those  two criteria is  enough.  For my purposes  this
question need not be resolved,  since I mean to show that the emergent rule  is untenable
on either  reading.
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includes  these  parties,  it  must  also  include  an  additional  group  of
civil  plaintiffs  so broad  and inclusive  that one  might  as  well refer  to
civil  plaintiffs generally.r2  By "must"  I mean  that I can  think  of  no
combination  of plausible moral principles  which  can  explain  or justify
the emergent rule without  strongly implying  its extension to  civil plain-
tiffs  generally.  (My challenge  to readers,  then,  is for them to think of
such  a  combination,  if  they  can.)  By  a  moral  principle,  I mean  a
general  statement  with  normative  content,  one  which  might  take  the
following  form:  "It  is  (not)  right  (or  good,  or  just,  or  expedient)
that  (a  certain  class  of  persons)  (under  certain  circumstances)  (be
accorded  certain  treatment)."  It  is  a  form  of  statement  which  might
be  suitable  as  a sentence  in a constitution,  aimed  at establishing  some
sort of personal  right.  But  actual  constitutional  texts  are ignored  for
the  time  being.  In  Part  I,  I  seek  to  persuade  only  that  there  is
no plausible  moral view,  simple or complex, that will explain or justify
the  rule  that  differentiates  between  X  and  civil  plaintiffs  generally.
Success  in  that  endeavor  will  not  itself  establish  that  indigent  civil
plaintiffs  generally  are  constitutionally  entitled  to  access-fee  relief,
but it will be an important step along the way.
2. The Principles  To Be Examined
The  process I have  undertaken  and have  tried  to recreate  in  the
following  pages  is  one  of  progressively  strenuous,  progressively  re-
fined  attempts  to formulate  principles  capable  of explaining  the  emer-
gent rule.  One begins  at or near  the  surface  of the  Court's  opinions,
testing  a principle  immediately  suggested  by the  Court's own  formula-
tions.  This suggestion  is rejected,  and  a somewhat more  imaginative
or  more  refined  formulation  is  then  attempted.  The  process  of  suc-
cessive  rejection  and  reformulation  continues  until  obscure  depths
(or  dizzying  heights)  are  reached  where  neither  rejection  nor  accept-
ance  of  the imagined  principle  is  possible,  but  only  amazement  that
the  principle  (or if  not it,  then  some  equally  astounding  alternative)
could  turn out  to  be  a necessary  postulate  for  a decision  of  the  Su-
preme Court.
A principle  may be  rejected  either  because  it simply  fails  to  ex-
plain  the  emergent  rule even  if  valid  ("fails  descriptively")  or  be-
cause  the  content  of  the  principle  is  defective  ("fails  substantive-
ly") .53  Substantive  failure  may flow from  either or both  of  two  con-
52.  See  notes  191-98 infra and  accompanying text.
53.  A  principle  may  fail  descriptively  by  "proving  too  much."  See  notes  103-05
infra and  accompanying  text.  That  any  single  principle  fails  in  this  way  is  not  a
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siderations:  (1)  the  principle  is  inconsistent  with  other  Supreme
Court doctrines  ("inconsistent')  and  (2)  the principle  seems intuitively
wrong ("implausible").
Using  the  foregoing  paraphernalia,  a  reasonably  simple  map
may be  provided for the discussion which  follows.  Principles  are con-
sidered in the order of their numerical designations.
Principle I: 4  A person is  entitled  to a judicial  hearing  when he
cannot  by  extrajudicial  means  obtain  relief  to  which  he  may  be
lawfully  entitled.  In  other  situations,  exclusion  by  access  fees  is
permissible.  (This  principle fails descriptively,55  and its  plausibility is
highly  dubious."")
Principle  II:17  A person is entitled to a judicial hearing when  de-
nial  will  result  in an  adverse,  legally  final  determination  of that per-
son's legal claims  or defenses.  In other  situations, exclusion by access
fees  is  permissible.  (This  proposition  fails  substantively  for  both in-
consistency"  and implausibility,5  and it also fails  descriptively.60)
Principle  III:61  A person's  claim to a judicial hearing  is stronger
when  his legal proposition  represents one  of his individual  rights  than
when  it represents  a mere  prosecutorial  role in  a deterrence  program
having  social  welfare  objectives.  (Principle m  fails  descriptively.62)
Principle  IV:63  A person's claim to a judicial hearing  is stronger
when  his object in litigating is prevention of an impending  violation of
his rights than when  it is merely  reparation  for past  violations  of his
rights.  (This  principle  fails  substantively  for  inconsistency"  and,
perhaps,  implausibility.65  It  also  partly  fails  descriptively.66)
conclusive argument  against its validity.  There might be a group of  two or more  prin-
ciples  which  combine  in  such a way  as to explain  the emergent  rule,  even  though  any
one  of  them  taken  by  itself, without  the  limitations  introduced by  the  others,  would
prove  too  much.  It  turns  out,  however,  that attempts  to combine  the  principles  inti-
mated  by the Court lead  to extreme  implausibility,  as  the text from time  to time  will
point out.  See notes  159-60 infra and accompanying  text.
54.  See text accompanying notes  100-05  infra.
55.  See  text accompanying  notes  103-05  infra.
56.  See  notes  100-02 infra and accompanying text.
57.  See  text accompanying notes 106-14 infra.
58.  See  notes  107-09  infra and  accompanying  text.
59.  See  notes  110-14  infra and  accompanying  text.
60.  See  pp. 1181-82 infra.
61.  See  text accompanying  notes 115-28  infra.
62.  See  notes 118-20  infra and accompanying  text.
63.  See text accompanying notes  129-3 8 infra.
64.  See  notes  132-38  infra and accompanying  text.
65.  See notes  129-31  infra and  accompanying  text.
66.  See note  151  infra.
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Principle V:67   It  is  more  important  to  assure  judicial  hearings
for  those  seeking  to  prevent  the  state  from  actively  violating  their
rights  than  to  assure  such hearings  for  those  seeking  merely  to  rouse
the  state  from  its  passive  failure  to  protect  their  rights.  (Both  the
plausibility  and  the  descriptive  applicability  of  this  principle  are  ex-
tremely dubious.)
Principle VI:68   The  importance  of  assuring  ability  to  litigate
varies  with  the  importance  of  the  damage  to  a  personi's  life  which
might  result  from lack  of  such  assurance.  (This  proposition  is  quite
plausible; but it fails descriptively.)
Principle VII:69  Assurance  of  judicial  hearings  is  more  impor-
tant for  those  seeking  to  vindicate  constitutional  rights than for  those
urging  other legal  rights.  (This principle  fails  descriptively7  and also
fails substantively for implausibility.)7'
3. How Principles  Are Tested: Litigation Values
One  cannot  hope  or  pretend  to  differentiate  among  potential
litigation  contexts,  with  a view  to ranking  those contexts  according  to
the urgency  or desirability of applying to them measures  aimed at facili-
tating actual litigation  (of which  access-fee  relief for indigents  is one),
without  believing  that  there  are  generally  accepted  reasons for  mak-
ing litigation  possible.  I think  we  take little risk of serious  distortion
if we try to frame those reasons in terms of the values  (ends,  interests,
purposes)  that  are  supposed  to  be  furthered  by  allowing  persons  to
litigate.
I  have  been  able  to  identify  four  discrete,  though  interrelated,
types  of  such values,  which  may  be  called  dignity  values,  participa-
tion  values,  deterrence  values,  and  (to  choose  a  clumsily  neutral
term)  effectuation  values.  Dignity values reflect  concern  for  the  hu-
miliation  or loss  of  self-respect  which  a  person might suffer  if denied
an  opportunity  to  litigate.  Participation  values reflect  an  appreciation
of litigation  as  one  of the  modes in which  persons  exert influence,  or
have  their  wills  "counted,"  in  societal  decisions  they  care  about.7 2
67.  See  text accompanying  notes  139-50  infra.
68.  See  text  accompanying  notes  151-58,  191-98  infra.
69.  See  text accompanying  notes  159-90 infra.
70.  See note  159 infra and accompanying  text.
71.  See  notes 160-86  infra and  accompanying text.
72.  See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in  CoLLECTE  BARaine  -
ING AND THE  ARBITRATOR'S  RoLE  8,  24  (M. Kahn  ed.  1962);  Tribe, Technology Assess-
ment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46  S.  CAL.
L. REV.  617, 631  (1973).
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Deterrence  values  recognize  the  instrumentality  of  litigation  as  a
mechanism  for influencing  or constraining  individual behavior  in ways
thought  socially  desirable. 3  Effectuation values  see  litigation  as  an
important  means  through  which  persons  are  enabled  to  get,  or  are
given  assurance  of  having,  whatever  we  are  pleased  to  regard  as
rightfully theirs.
In  dealing  first,  and  preliminarily,  with  dignity  and  participa-
tion values, I  simply  assume that these values do,  to  some non-negligi-
ble  extent,  help  shape  general,  conventional,  and  popular  notions  of
what  litigation  is  "for."  My  main,  and  limited,  purpose  is  to  show
that neither of these two types  of values can by itself  easily explain the
emergent  rule  of Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein.  I also  observe  in pass-
ing that each type  can contribute  something  positive  toward  the  argu-
ment for  a broadly  conceived  right of  court  access.  I thereafter  turn
to  the  effectuation  and  deterrence  values,  which  seem  superficially
likely to explain  or justify the  emergent  rule but whose  assiduous  pur-
suit leads to those deep theoretical  conundrums I  have mentioned.
Dignity values.  These  seem  most  clearly  offended  when  a per-
son  confronts  a  formal,  state-sponsored,  public  proceeding  charging
wrongdoing,  failure,  or defect,  and the person is either prevented from
responding  or forced  to respond without  the  assistance  and resources
that a self-respecting response necessitates.
The  damage  to  self-respect  from  the  inability  to  defend  oneself
properly seems  likely to be most severe in the  case of criminal prosecu-
tion,  where  representatives  of  civil  society  attempt  in  a public  forum
to brand  one  a violator of important societal  norms.  Thus,  if the fee
decisions  on the  criminal  side  are  to be justified  by dignity values  (as
seems  perfectly  plausible),' 4  these  holdings  may  not  have  any  con-
trolling significance for the civil side.
73.  A possibly more accurate  (but less distinct)  label would  have been  "social  wel-
fare  values."  The  category  is  intended to  stand for  all  interpretations  of  litigation  as
a  means  for  maximizing  value  across  society,  as  distinguished  from  securing  to  the
victorious  party  his  due.  In  a  given  case,  value  maximization  might  be  effectuated
through  an  act  of  redistribution  of wealth  (the  immediate  impact of  the  judgment  or
decree  itself),  rather  than through an  act of  (negative or affirmative)  deterrence  strictly
speaking  (the impact  on future behavior of knowledge  of the decision  and its grounds).
The  contemporary  literature  on  a  social-welfare,  or  "economic,"  or  "deterrence"
interpretation  of  law  is  voluminous  and  growing.  A  significant  portion  of  this  ma-
terial,  and citations to much of the rest,  can easily be found by scanning the Journal of
Law  and  Economics  and  the  Journal of  Legal  Studies  (each  since  its  inception).
For  two impressive  book-length presentations,  see  G.  CALABRusi,  THE  CosTs  op  Acci-
DEvs:  A  LEGAL  AND  EcoNomic ANALYsis  (1970),  and PosNa.
74.  The  Supreme  Court's  sensitivity  to  dignity  values  in  criminal  contexts  is
suggested  by its recent decision  in United States v.  Ash,  413  U.S.  300  (1973)  (no  re-
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Of  course,  one  immediately  sees  that there  are  some  nominally
"civil"  contexts  where the  would-be litigant  is trying to  fend off  accu-
satory action  by the government  threatening  rather  dire  and stigmatiz-
ing results  (for example,  a proceeding  to  divest a parent of custody of
a  child  on  grounds  of  unfitness),  which  are  exceedingly  difficult  to
distinguish  from  standard  criminal  contexts  in  dignity  value  terms.7 1
Still these  cases  do not by themselves  show  that the dignity  notion  is
uncontainable.  Challenging  though it may be in  a few  cases  to draw
the  line between  the  quasi-criminal  and  the  noncriminal  context,  the
determination usually will not be insuperably difficult.
But this  is hardly  to  say  that dignity  considerations  are  entirely
absent  from  civil  contexts.  Perhaps  there is  something  generally  de-
meaning,  humiliating,  and  infuriating  about  finding  oneself  in  a  dis-
pute over  legal  rights  and  wrongs  and  being  unable  to  uphold  one's
own  side  of the  case.  How  serious  these  affects  are  seems  to depend
on  various  factors  including,  possibly,  the  identity  of  the  adversary
(is  it the  government?),  the  origin  of  the  argument  (did  the  person
willingly  start it himself?),  the possible  outcomes  (will  the  person,  or
others,  feel  that  he  has  been  determined  to  be  a  wrongdoer?),  and
how public the  struggle  has become  (has  it reached  the  courts  yet?).
That listing of factors might seem to  lend a degree  of plausibility
to  a  general  right of  court  access  for  civil  defendants  though  not for
civil  plaintiffs.  But the  idea is really not very persuasive  on  close  in-
spection.  Consider  Ortwein's  situation.  He  was  not  accused  of  any
crime.  Indeed,  the  government was  able to work its will  against  him
without  starting  any public  proceeding;  the  choice  to  take  the  dispute
to  a public forum  was  Ortwein's  own.  On the  other hand,  Ortwein's
adversary  was  the  government;  and  the  government's  actions  did  im-
ply that he  was  demanding  more  than his  lawful  entitlement.70   That
a person's  self-respect  might  be  seriously  injured  by inability  to have
that charge  tested in a credibly impartial tribunal  seems  entirely likely.
quirement  that  counsel  be  present  at  post-indictment  photographic  identification  pro-
ceeding where  accused  is  not present),  which  should be  compared  with  United  States
v. Wade,  388  U.S.  218  (1967)  (right  to have  counsel  present  at  lineup  proceeding).
The Ash  opinion  suggests that  one  reason for  treating  the two  cases differently  is  that
an  accused  has  a  special  need for the  support  of  counsel  when  subjected  to  a  "trial-
like confrontation."  413 U.S. at 312-13.
75.  See cases  cited note  43  supra; Willging,  Financial  Barriers and the Access  of
Indigents to the Courts, 57 Gao. L..  253,  270 (1968).
76.  The  situation  illustrates  a  more  general  point  made  below:  there  is  no
particular reason to assume that the party  to a controversy  who  becomes  plaintiff  in a
lawsuit is "the aggressor" in the controversy  viewed in its entirety.  See text accompany-
ing notes  112-14 infra.
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Nor does it seem that such a likelihood can readily be ruled out in
various  other  plaintiff  contexts  that  easily  come  to mind:  a  citizen
wishes  to  sue  a governmental  body  for  breach  of  contract  or for  tax
refund;  a customer  wishes  to  sue  an  automobile  mechanic  for breach
of  warranty;  a member  wishes  to  challenge  his  expulsion  from  a pri-
vate  association  (or  a  worker,  his  dismissal  from  private  employ-
ment);  a  tenant wishes  to  sue  his landlord  for having  evicted  him  for
a  malicious  or  erroneous  (and  allegedly  unlawful)  reason;  an  ag-
grieved  party  wishes  to  sue  another  for  defamation,  or  for  assault,
or for malpractice,  or for breach  of trust.  It seems  that denial of ac-
cess would noticeably  arouse dignity concerns in  all  these cases. 77  No
doubt, there  are  variations  in the  degree  of injury,  depending  on per-
mutations  of  relevant  factors;  but  dignity  concerns  seem  widespread
through the juridical sector.
Participation  values.  The  illumination  that may  sometimes  flow
from  viewing  litigation  as  a  mode  of  politics  has  escaped  neither
courts78  nor legal  theorists.7 9   But I  can  see no way of trenchantly de-
ploying  that insight so  as  to  rank litigation  contexts for  purposes  of a
selective  access-fee  relief  rule.80   (Certainly  the  Supreme  Court's
emergent  rule cannot be  construed  to reflect  any  such  ranking.)
But  if  participation  values  cannot  help  us  differentiate  among
litigation  contexts,  they  can  contribute  significantly  to  the  argument
for  a broad  constitutional  right  of  court  access.  Participation  values
are at the  root of the  claim that such a right can be  derived from the
first amendment,81  a claim that I shall not pursue.  And they  also help
inspire  the  analogy  between  general litigation  rights  and  general  vot-
ing rights, a theme upon which I shall rely heavily in Part II.
Deterrence values.  Litigation  is often,  and enlighteningly,  viewed
as a process,  or part of a process,  for constraining  all agents  in society
to  the  performance  of duties  and  obligations  imposed  with  a view  to
social welfare.  A possible  link between  deterrence  values  and  access
77.  Cf. Wiliging, supra note 75, at 270-71.
78.  E.g., NAACP  v. Button, 371 U.S. 415  (1963).
79.  See note  72 supra.
80.  Someone  might  suggest  that  in  litigation  dominated  by  "public  interest"  ob-
jectives  there  is no  urgent  need  to  assure  participation  by  any  particular  indigent  in-
dividual.  But eminent  moralists  insist,  and the legal  order's  treatment of  voting rights
confirms, that participation  values are weighty  in public  interest  contexts.  See  Kramer
v. Union Free School  Dist.,  395 U.S.  621  (1969);  Harper v. Virginia  Bd. of Elections,
383  U.S.  663  (1966);  Michelman  995-96  (discussing  J. RAwLs,  A  THEORY  OF  JUSTICE
(1971)  ).
81.  See  Note,  A  First Amendment  Right to  Access  to  the  Courts for Indigents,
82 YALE  L.J. 1055  (1973).
Vol.  1973:1153] 1175DUKE LAW  JOURNAL
fees  is,  of course,  supplied  by  the  obvious  frustration  of  those  values
which results  if the person  in the best position,  or most naturally  mo-
tivated,  to pursue judicial  enforcement  of such constraints is prevented
by  access  fees  from  doing  so.82  The  pervasiveness  of  deterrence  fac-
tors  throughout the juridical sector,  like  that of dignity and  participa-
tion  factors,  adds  force  to the  argument  for  breadth  or  generality  in
any  right  of  court  access.  In  order  to  establish  beyond  serious  de-
bate  that  society's  interest  in  constraining  agents  to  the  performance
of legal duties has  a nigh universal relevance,  one need only refer to the
lively  contemporary  interest  in  a  "cost-internalization"  rationale  for
tort law,83 to the related literature  that would connect  the  very  defini-
tion of legal rights to  a goal of economic  optimizing,84  and to the utili-
tarian  considerations  commonly  thought  to  support  the  imperative  of
pacta  sunt servanda.
8 5
As  we  shall  see,  this  very  universality  means  that  deterrence
theory  cannot  convincingly  differentiate  among  litigation  contexts,  so
as  to  rank  them  for  access-fee  relief  purposes.  (It would  be  fun,
but  false,  to  turn  the  deterrence  perspective  against  the  Supreme
Court's  emergent  rule  by  suggesting  that  deterrence  is  a  function
served  by  plaintiffs, not  defendants,  so  that  civil  plaintiffs  have  a
stronger claim  for  access  than  defendants  have.  Alas,  affirmative
defenses  and  vigorous  defense,  the  risk  or  prospect  of  losing  a  law-
suit  and  so  remaining  "liable"  for  injuries  actually  sustained,8 0  play
no less  important  a part in deterrence  schemes  than  does  the risk  or
prospect that liability will be shifted.)87
Effectuation  values.  In  the  effectuation  perspective  we  view
the  world  from  the  standpoint  of  the  prospective  litigant  as  distin-
guished from that of society  as  a whole  or  as  a collectivity.  Value  is
ascribed  to  the  actual  protection  and  realization  of  those  interests  of
the  litigant  which  the  law purports  to protect  and  effectuate  (in  this
perspective  one  would  shamelessly  refer  to  those  interests  as  the  liti-
82.  But a stem economic  approach might nevertheless  conclude  that,  on the whole,
access fees are beneficial.  See  notes 110,  118-20 infra and accompanying  text.
83.  See,  e.g.,  Michelman,  Pollution As  a Tort:  A  Non-Accidental Perspective on
Calabresi's  Costs,  80 YAL  L..  647, 667 & n.32  (1971).
84.  E.g.,  Calabresi  & Melamed,  Property Rules, Liability  Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity:  One View  of the Cathedral, 85 HtIv. L. Rv. 1089  (1972);  Demsetz,  Wealth Dis-
tribution  and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STuDms 223  (1972).
85.  2 R.  ELY, PROPERTY  AND  CoNTRAcT  IN  THEIR  RELATIONS  TO  THE DIsTnmunON
oF WEALTH  578,  615-17  (1914).
86.  This is  the  appropriate  usage  of  "liability"  in  the  economic  interpretation  of
law.  See, e.g., G. CALABRESr, supra note 73, at 137.
87.  See,  e.g.,  PosNER  92-93,  323-25;  Posner,  Strict Liability:  A  Comment,  2  J.
LEGAL STUMIES  205, 207  (1973).
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gants  "rights?')  and  more  generally  to  a  prevailing  assurance  that
those  interests  will be  protected;  and litigation  is regarded  as  a proc-
ess,  or  as  a part  of  a  process,  for  providing  such  protection  and  as-
surance.  Notions  of  necessary  legal  protection  for rights  may be  in-
tuitive or philosophically  elaborated.  Elaborations  may range from the
extremely  abstract  and  deontological  (inferring  legal  rights,  say,  from
a  transcendental  Idea  of  Freedom)88  to  the  borderline  utilitarian
(viewing  rights  as  necessary  to the  preservation  of  a  satisfying  social
order) .8  They  may  vary  in  tone  and  emphasis  from  the  legalistic
(strict social contract theories, 90  or looser  contractarian  theories which
entail  legal protection  for rights  as a necessary part  of the ethical  justi-
fication  for  civil  society's  coercive  aspects)91  to  the  humanitarian
and  psychologically  oriented  (rights  regarded  as  one  of  the  lenses
through which  we view  and  find meaning in, or media  through which
we express  and give meaning to,  our notions of self,  personality, social
relationship).92  However  articulated,  defended,  or  accounted  for,  the
sense  of legal rights  as claims  whose  realization has intrinsic value can
fairly be called rampant in our culture and traditions.  Of  course,  this
sense is aroused more naturally  and  appropriately  by some  claims  and
predicaments  than  by  others;93  and  that  phenomenon  suggests  the
possibility  of  accounting  for  a selective  rule of  access-fee  relief by  re-
flection on effectuation values.
B.  PLAINTIFFS vis-,-vis DEFENDANTS
Consider the  class  of  all persons  proposing  to enter  the  litigation
arena  against  nongovernmental  adversaries94  in contexts  involving  nei-
ther "constitutional  rights'95  nor  any  need  for  a special  type  of  relief
88. See I.  KANT,  THE  METAPHYSICAL  ELEMENTS  OF  JUSTICE 35-39,  43-45,  53,  55-64
(J.  Ladd  transl.  1965).  There  can  be  no  disagreement  with  Dworkin,  The  Original
Position, 40  U.  Cm. L.  REv.  500,  522  (1973),  that  Kant's ethical  philosophy as  a
whole is  "duty-based" rather than "right-based."  Yet Kant seems to find it  possible,
all the  same, to found  the  jurisprudential component  of his  moral  system directly  on a
notion of  rights itself derived from  the notion of duty.
89. See  Michelman, Property,  Utility  and  Fairness:  Comments  on  the  Ethical
Foundations of  "Just Compensation" Law,  80  HARv. L.  REv. 1165,  1208-10  (1967)
(discussing David Hume).
90.  See  I. LocKE,  TmE  SEcoND  TREATisE OF  GOvERNMENT  (T. Peardon  ed.  1952).
91.  See R. Nozicx, ANARCHY,  STATE,  AND  UTOPIA  (forthcoming  1974).
92.  See Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology, 2 PBLosoPHY  & PuB.  AEAIms
66, 86-90  (1972).
93.  See E. CAlN,  THE SENSE  OF INJUSTICE 24-27 (paper ed. 1964).
94.  The  reasons for  this  qualification have already been outlined.  See note 15
supra.
95.  The  elusiveness  of  this  concept  need  not  detain  us  right  now.  See  notes
161-65 infra and accompanying text.
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obtainable  only through court proceedings.  By its opinions  in Boddie,
Kras, and Ortwein,  the  Supreme  Court  has  evidently  propounded  a
doctrine  under  which  the  court-access  rights  of members  of  this  class
are  to  be  largely  determined  by  dividing  them  into  the  two  sub-
classes of plaintiffs  and defendants.  Defendants have a strict constitu-
tional (due process) right of guaranteed  access,  assuring them not only
that they will have  adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard "
but  also  that  their  opportunity  will  not  be  frustrated  by  court  fees
which  they  cannot  afford to pay.97   Plaintiffs,  on the  other hand,  are
denied  the  last assurance.  (Plaintiffs,  of course,  have  no need for  as-
surance  of  notice.  Questionable  restrictions  on  the  hearing  formats
afforded  plaintiffs can  rarely,  if ever,  have  arisen; but if they  were to
arise,  one  imagines  the  Court  would  treat  them  under prevailing  due
process  notions.9s  It would  be  more  than  a little  surprising,  though
perhaps  not  inconceivable,  to  find  the  Court  saying  that  plaintiffs
must  accept such hearing  formats as  are  offered, no matter how  seem-
ingly  inadequate  or  unfair,  because  normally  a plaintiffs  engagement
in  litigation  is,  if  not exactly  a privilege,  also not  an overpoweringly
urgent  need.  Yet  something  like  that is  what the  Court seems  to  be
saying  about  plaintiffs  who  find  themselves  frustrated  by  exclusion-
ary fees instead of by procedural formats.)
The  question  now  to  be  addressed  is  whether  either  effectuation
values99  or  deterrence  values  afford  any plausible  basis  for  thus  gen-
erally  distinguishing  between  defendants  and  plaintiffs.  I first  con-
sider  whether  this  distinction  can  be  justified  by  using  the  notion  of
judicial  monopolization  of recourse which  has been  a prominent theme
in the Supreme Court's opinions.
1.  Judicial  Monopoly
The  monopoly  notion  is  disarmingly  simple.  Divorce,  the  re-
lief  sought  in Boddie, is  different  from  most  other  kinds  of  affirma-
tive  relief  that  anyone  might  require,  in that  it is  absolutely  unavail-
able except in the form of a judicial  decree.  It takes judicial action to
dissolve  a marriage,  but not to release a creditor's  claim.  The divorce-
96.  This  was  the question  involved in many  cases  cited by the  Boddie Court  con-
firming the due process rights of defendants.  See 401 U.S. at  377-79 & nn.3-6.
97.  See note  50 supra.
98.  There  is  also  the possibility,  in  certain  circumstances,  of challenge  under  the
equal protection  clause.  But cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56  (1972).
99.  Effectuation  values,  in  this  context,  should  be  viewed  as  complemented  or
illuminated by dignity or participation values.
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seeker  has  a peculiarly  urgent  need  for  court  access  because  there is
literally no other avenue to relief.
Now  to  some  observers,1 00  this  attempt  to  limit  the  reach  of
Boddie fairly passeth  understanding.  The court,  after  all,  usually has
a monopoly on lawful deployment of remedial force; and this monopoly
applies  to plaintiffs  across  the  board.  An  indigent  insolvent  person,
for  example, has  alternative  avenues  to relief  from debts  only  on the
assumption  that  his  creditors  are  not  unyielding.  But  why  should
they  yield,  since  he  is  indigent  and, by  holding  out,  they  cannot  get
less than they would get out of bankruptcy?' 0 1
Or  consider  the  case  of  an  impoverished  person  who  objects  to
emission  of  poisonous  gases  near  his residence,  a  situation  which he
thinks  constitutes  an  actionable  nuisance.  Not  only  is  out-of-court
settlement  unavailable  unless  the  alleged  nuisance-maker  is  disposed
to negotiate, but, more generally,  the  clearer  it becomes that the  com-
plaining  party lacks  both the money to  buy  out  the  nuisance  and the
equipage  to  conduct an effective lawsuit, the less pressure there  will be
on  the offender  to  turn his  thoughts  toward settlement. 02  The  same
reasoning  seems  to  hold  for  a broad  spectrum  of imaginable  contro-
versies.
At any  rate, it is apparent  that the  "monopoly"  factor which  ac-
tivates  special  access  rights  for  divorce  suitors  refers  strictly  to  the
legal possibility,  and not the practical likelihood,  of extrajudicial relief.
To  be  sure,  there  is  nothing  internally  illogical  or incoherent  in such
a notion.  Its  defect  is  not that it is  unintelligible,  but, quite  as  fatal,
that it is  unpersuasive-that  it lacks  any  external  coherence  with  the
context  of common  understandings  within which it arises.  This short-
coming  is strongly  suggested by a review  of the Court's own derivation
of  the  monopoly notion.  The  notion  appears  to  have  been  conceived
by Justice  Harlan  for a specific  argumentative  purpose,  that of  assimi-
lating the  predicament  of the  Boddie petitioners  to the plight common
to  civil  defendants-a  comparison  deemed  significant  because  of  an
initial  assumption  that  civil  defendants  generally  enjoy  constitutional
100. See  Boddie v.  Connecticut,  401  U.S.  371,  387  (1971)  (concurring  opinion  of
Brennan, J.).
101.  See  United  States  v.  Kras,  409  U.S. 434,  455  (1972)  (dissenting  opinion  of
Stewart,  J.).  Why  didn't  the  Kras dissenters  notice  and  mention  that  the  Boddie
petitioners  also  had available  an  extrajudicial way around  their problem?  (Could they
not have begged the cash required for filing fees?)
102.  See  Goodpaster,  The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv.  223,  234 (1970);
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HIAv. L. REV. 40, 104, 106  (1971).
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protection  against  exclusionary  court  access  fees,  the  very  protection
that the Boddie reasoning meant to extend to divorce suitors.
Judicial  monopoly,  then,  was  conceived  as  the  common  element
mandating  for  divorce  suitors  the  same  protection  against  exclusion-
ary  court fees  as  the  generality of defendants  enjoy.  Just  as  a person
once  married  cannot  become  unmarried  without  gaining  access  to  a
court,  so  a  person  once  haled  into  court  cannot  avoid  an  adverse
judgment without making an appearance.
But  is the  latter proposition true?  Quite  plainly  it is not,  except
in  a nontechnical,  empirically  contingent  sense:  that  is,  it contains  a
factual  assumption  that  the  defendant  will  fail in any  attempt  to  gain
relief  by  negotiating  an  out-of-court  settlement  accompanied  by  a
voluntary  nonsuit.1 03   To  be  sure, that  assumption  seems  likely  to  be
true  as  a practical  matter  whenever  a  defendant  is  so  short  of funds
as to be  effectively  excluded by court fees.  For why would  a plaintiff
agree  to  settle  when  a  default  judgment  (or  financially  crippled  de-
fense)  could  be  anticipated? 1 04  It is  easy  to  see  the  considerations
-of  effectuation  and  of  deterrence-that  argue  for  invalidating  ex-
clusionary access  fees  as  applied  to  civil  defendants.  But then how is
the  situation any  different  for  the  generality of  civil  plaintiffs?  If
practical lack  of  alternative  recourse  is  what  justifies  access-fee  im-
munity  for  indigent  civil  defendants  (such  immunity  being  the  very
premise  from  which  the Boddie  analogy  proceeds),  by  what  transfor-
mation  do we  arrive at the conclusion  that technical lack of alternative
recourse  is what  it  takes  to  justify  analogous  relief  for  indigent  civil
plaintiffs?  Monopoly  in the  technical  sense,  while  it  succeeds  in  dis-
criminating  divorce  suitors  from  the  generality  of  plaintiffs,  utterly
fails  to  distinguish the  latter group from civil  defendants; and civil  de-
fendants  are  the  very  group  whose  established  (or  assumed)  due
process  rights provided  the  major  premise  for the Boddie syllogism,1 05
insofar as "monopoly" is operative in that syllogism.
Well,  perhaps  "utterly"  is  too  strong.  When  a  defendant  suf-
fers a default judgment,  or makes  an inept  defense  and loses,  the harm
103.  Cf. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term,  85 HAv. L. REv. 40, 106  (1971).
104.  He might settle for something .lose  to a  complete victory.  Are we, in deciding
whether a party has any extrajudicial recourse  available,  supposed to apply any  criteria
of fairness  or reasonableness  to  the  hypothetical  private  settlement?  Could  the  Kras
Court have given any satisfying answer to that question?
105.  All  civil  litigants  who  have  no  extrajudicial  recourse  are  protected  against
exclusionary  access  fees.  Divorce  suitors,  like  defendants  generally,  are  civil litigants
who  have  no  extrajudicial  recourse.  Therefore,  divorce  suitors  are protected  against
exclusionary  access fees,
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he incurs  (and the  accompanying loss  of deterrence) has  the  peculiarly
vexing  quality  of  legal  finality:  however  legally  unjustified  may  be
the  imposition  on  the  defendant's  interests,  however  legally  valid  the
opposing  claim  or  defense  he  might have  asserted,  legal  recourse  will
henceforth  be  denied.  In  contrast,  whatever  harm  has  been  suffered
by  the  would-be  plaintiff  who  is  barred  from  court  by  access  fees
(the  supposed  tort,  breach  of  contract,  or whatever)  remains  a  possi-
ble  topic  for  legal  recourse  at  some  future  time.1 06  Thus  it  can  be
said  that  there  is a  kind  of  judicial  monopoly  confronting  indigent
civil  defendants  but  not  indigent  civil  plaintiffs-that  is,  control  of
the  only  practical  avenue  of  possible  escape  from  a  judicially  final,
adverse determination of claims and defenses.
It is  thus  possible  to  make  an  intelligible,  descriptive  statement,
containing  judicial  monopoly  as  an  operative  notion,  which  factually
differentiates  between  defendants  and  plaintiffs.  But  does  the  state-
ment, however,  descriptively  intelligible,  also  justify the  differentiation
that it describes?  A  number  of  considerations  can  be  marshalled  to
show that it does not.
First, to  conceive  of  the  monopoly  factor  in  terms  of  the  im-
minence  of legal  finality  only  serves  to  aggravate  our problems  with
the  Boddie  rationale.  No  monopoly  element  of  the  "finality"  sort
can be  found in the Boddie situation.  Had the fees  there not been in-
validated,  the  petitioners'  right eventually  to  sue for  divorce would not
have been  prejudiced.  Thus "monopoly,"  if taken  as  an element which
detaches  divorce  contexts  from  the  generality  of  civil  plaintiff  con-
texts  and  assimilates  the  former  to  civil  defendant  contexts  instead,
must  have  a  remarkably  complex  meaning-something  like:  "in de-
fendant  contexts  the  practical inability  to  avoid  finality  extrajudici-
ally,  and in plaintiff  contexts the  technical inability  to gain affirmative
relief extrajudicially."  No  reason  comes  readily  to mind  why  practi-
cal  inability to  avoid finality should be equated with technical  inability
to  gain  affirmative  relief.  Indeed,  the  equation  seems  so  artificial  as
106.  For  commentary  advancing  the  idea  that  legal  finality  is  the  precise  impact
which  the state may  not inflict  without  a prior due  process  hearing, see  Dunham,  Due
Process and Commercial Law,  1972  Sup. Cr. REv.  135.  Insofar as  Professor Dunham
means  to explain and  limit Fuentes by this  thesis, he seems  to be hindered  by  the facts
mentioned  previously.  See  notes  7,  9  supra.  Hindered,  but  perhaps  not  defeated.
For Dunham  would  apply  his principle  to  require  a  prior hearing  whenever  the  state
would  clothe  a  person  with  "diminished  responsibility"  for  the  results  of  his  action
pursuant  to  court order,  including,  it  seems,  such  results  as personal  injury  caused  by
overzealous  recovery  tactics.  Id.  at  151.  And  it  does  not  appear  from  the  Court's
opinion  whether  the  statutes  invalidated  in  Fuentes conferred  that  sort  of  immunity
or not.
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to  deserve  overwhelming  suspicion  that  it has  been  invented  for  the
sole purpose of rationalizing  ("describing"  is really more  accurate)  the
joint results of Boddie and Kras, or of Boddie and Ortwein.
Second,  there  is  reason  to  doubt  that  the  threat  of  judicial  fi-
nality  has  normally  been  regarded  as  a  critical factor  in  due  process
appraisal  of a  person's  demand  for  an  opportunity  to be  heard.  No
such  factor  is present  when  hearing  opportunities  are  sought  in order
to  contest  pending  administrative  action  such  as  dismissal  from  em-
ployment  or  seizure  of  one's  property  (for if the  dismissal  or  seizure
is  later  found  wrongful  by  a reviewing  court,  the  court  can  usually
award compensatory  relief);  yet due process  is  held to guarantee  hear-
ing  opportunities in many  such contexts-presumably  because  effectu-
ation  and deterrence  values  are better  served  by requiring  hearings  at
the  admittedly  nonfinal level of administrative  decision than by relying
solely on judicial review.' °7
Following  the  lead  of  Fuentes v.  Shevin, 08  we  might  say  that
what this  shows  is not  that finality  is not  a crucial  factor,  but rather
that  temporary  (though  compensable)  abeyance  in  the  enjoyment  of
one's  rights  (which will  occur "finally"  if  the  dismissal or  seizure  goes
forward, even if subject to the possibility of later reversal)  is  of no  less
concern  than  permanent  abeyance  in  the  due  process  calculus.  The
interim  deprivation  is "final" in the  sense that eventual  reparation  can-
not restore  the  world  to its  predeprivation  state.  But  the  postpone-
ment  of  an  indigent  plaintiff's  lawsuit  just  as  clearly  subjects  him  to
the risk of  a "final"  deprivation  of the  enjoyment  of his  rights  over  a
given period of time.1 0
Third, effectuation  values  seem  unlikely  to  be  assuaged  by  the
hypothetical  possibility  of  future judicial  recourse,  once  such  recourse
is  seen to  have  been  placed  out  of reach  not  only for  the  time  being
but for  the incalculable  future.  To  accord  critical  weight  to  absence
of a finality threat seems  quite unreasonable  unless  it can fairly be as-
sumed  that the  condition  presently  barring  access  to  relief  will  in  all
likelihood disappear soon enough that relief will still be timely." 0  But
107.  Cf.  POSNER  334.
108.  407 U.S. 67  (1972).
109.  When  the plaintiff is  seeking  monetary,  compensatory  relief for  some  already
consummated  injury,  it  might  seem  that  postponement  is  merely  postponement,  and
not irremediable  deprivation.  But if  that  relief is  something  to  which  one  is  entitled
(see  notes  132-38  infra  and  accompanying  text)  involuntary  delay  in  recovering  it
seems  no  less  an irremediable  deprivation  than  involuntary  delay  in receiving  posses-
sion  of a chattel.
110.  Insofar  as  rights  and  their  recognition  and  enforcement  are  valued  for  their
bearing  on  the  self-concept  of  the  rights-holder  (see  text  accompanying  notes  88-93
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such  an assumption  seems  arbitrary where  the  access-defeating  condi-
tion  is  a  would-be  litigant's  financial  incapacity  (interacting  with  an
access  fee).  What  law  of  nature  or  fact  of  human  experience  sug-
gests that such a condition tends to be temporary?'11
Fourth, and I  believe  most  fundamental,  the  respective  litigating
supra & text  accompanying  note  158  infra), it may  truly  be  that  justice  delayed  is
justice  denied.  Perhaps  the  experience  of  finding  deserved  relief  unobtainable  when
you reasonably want it is irreparable.
Insofar  as  violations  are  compensable  in  money,  and  money  judgments  carry
interest  from  the time  of  the  violation,  delay  in  recovery  will  not  impair  overall  de-
terrence  if the  interest  rate  is  appropriately  fixed.  Of  course,  deterrence  will  be  im-
paired  insofar  as  meritorious  actions  are  never  brought;  and  extended  delay  may
progressively  impair  the  victim's  incentive  or  ability  ever  to  bring  his  action  apart
from whether he  eventually  becomes  able to  pay the  access  fees.  (On  this  point, too,
the  fixing of  the  interest  rate  is  important.)  However,  this impairment  of  deterrence
may be thought  a price  worth paying for  the beneficial  screening  effect  of access  fees
-their  effect of weeding  out claims  whose  administrative  costs  of  adjudication  and  en-
forcement  (including  the parties'  time and  trouble)  are not  worth their  marginal  con-
tribution  to deterrence.
111.  How  is  the  problem  affected  by  statutes  of  limitations?  Imagine  that  peti-
tioner A  in my  story  (see  text  accompanying  notes  4-15  supra)  has been  unable  to
afford  the filing fee at  any  time since  the company  took  the car and that  the statutory
limitations period for tort  actions  is  about  to expire.  Does  the court now  grant relief
from the fee?  What reasoning  argues for granting  such  relief just at the  moment-and
not  a  moment  sooner-when,  according  to  legislative  judgment,  evidence  is  turning
stale  and men's  estates should  at  last be  quieted?  The court  could  complicate,  though
not avoid,  this embarrassment  by  continuing  to uphold  the fee  requirement but, in  ef-
fect,  writing  a  new  "tolling"  provision  into  the  statute  of  limitations  which  would
suspend  the  running  of  the  period  for  as  long  as  the  potential  plaintiff  continues
unable  to  afford  the  fees.  Again,  one  would  want  to  know  what  reasoning  justifies
this form of  access-rights protection  (which overrides  pro tanto the legislative  judgments
embodied in the limitations  statute)  that does not also justify immediate relief from fees
when  relief  is  first  sought.  Perhaps  the  answer  could  be  that the  "tolling"  technique
preserves the  economically  beneficial  screening  effect  of the  fee.  See note  110  supra.
But this technique  does  so  at  the  sacrifice  of  the rather  different  screening  effects  of
the limitations  statutes, which-in the economic  perspective we are bound  to suppose-
were  intended  to  have  equally  important,  cost-saving  objectives.  How  can  the  court
decide which cost-saving program-access-fee  screening or limitations-period  screening-
takes precedence?  That problem could  be avoided  by sternly insisting  on both screening
processes  and  granting  neither  relief  from  fees  at  the  outset  nor tolling  of  the  limi-
tations period.  But if the  court adopts  that  move,  it  will  contradict  the Boddie-Kras-
Ortwein thesis  (as  refined herein)  that  access fees may  not be  applied so  as to exclude
litigants  from court  when  they have  no other way  of  avoiding  a legally  final,  adverse
determination  of  their  claims.  At  the  expiration  of  the  limitations  period,  the  fee-
frustrated potential  plaintiff  is visited with "finality"  no less final than that which  visits
a defendant upon expiration of the time allowed for appeal from an adverse judgment.
The conundrum  discussed in  this footnote  hints at a truth I  shall harp  on below-
that  the  Supreme  Court's  firm  support  for  the  (procedural)  due  process  claims  of
defendants  cannot be harmonized with a strict economic approach  either  to due  process
claims  in general  or to those  of plaintiffs  in particular.  See  text accompanying  notes
121-27  infra.
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postures  of the parties-the  question  of who  finds  himself in the  posi-
tion of having to take the matter to court in order to bring it to a head,
and  the  question  of  who  is  in  the  position  of  having  to  appear  and
defend  in order  to  have  any  hope  of  avoiding  a legally  final,  adverse
determination-seems  very  likely  to  be  a  result  of  factors,  whether
tactics  or mere  happenstance,  which  are  quite irrelevant  to  any  of the
types  of values  possibly  governing  the access-fee  relief  question.  On
principle,  the  accident  of  respective  litigating  postures  cannot  carry
the burden  of determining  whether  an indigent person will be  allowed
to have his day in court at the time when he is moved to seek it." 2
Consider  the  fact  situation  disclosed  in  case A  in the  story  told
earlier,  together  with  a possible  variation  in which  petitioner  A  phys-
ically repulses  the  company's agent efforts  to  take  away  the  car.  Can
it really be that A  is  guaranteed  an expeditious  judicial hearing  on the
question  of  title  if he  has  won  the  physical  contest  but not  zY  he  has
lost it?" 3   Or imagine  a  landlord-tenant  dispute  in which  the  tenant
refuses  to  pay rent  which  the  landlord  says  is  due,  and  the  landlord
refuses  to  make  repairs  which  the  tenant  says  are  promised  in  the
lease  or required  by implied  warranty.  If the landlord reacts  by suing
for eviction  or  rent  arrears  and  the  tenant  uses  the repair  claim  de-
fensively  (say,  on  a  theory  of  dependent  covenants),  the  tenant  is
apparently  immunized  from  court  fees.  But  if  the  landlord  instead
happens  upon  the  tactic  of  cutting  off  the  tenant's  heat  or  of  taking
possession  of the tenant's  chattels  under color of  a landlord's  lien, the
tenant  will  automatically  "lose"  if he is unable to  afford  whatever  fees
are charged as a condition of his access to court."14
My  conclusion from  the  foregoing  discussion  can be summarized
this way:  whether the monopoly notion be taken as referring to techni-
cal  or practical  preclusion  or both, whether it be taken  as  referring to
affirmative  relief or  avoidance  of finality or both,  there  is  no possible
112.  Professor  LaFrance  may  somewhat  overstate  the  point  in  asserting  that  all
plaintiffs  "have  . . . been  imposed upon;  vis-a-vis  the wrong  and  the wrongdoer,  they
are  defendants,  seeking  to  enforce  a counterclaim."  LaFrance,  supra note  15,  at  536.
But he seems quite  correct  in adding that the "roles of plaintiff  and defendant  are often
functionally indistinguishable."  Id.
113.  By  an expeditious  hearing, I mean a hearing as soon as there is occasion  for A
to want one  (within whatever constraints are imposed  by litigation backlogs and queues):
if he  lost the physical  contest, the taking of the car would  be that occasion,  whereas  if
he won the contest, his being sued by the company would be that occasion.
114.  See Willging, supra note 75,  at 287.  It will be of  interest in Part II that  land-
lord self-help  under a landlord's  lien  is arguably  a  violation  of  due  process.  See,  e.g.,
Landers & Clark, Sniadach,  Fuentes and Beyond:  The Creditor  Meets  the Constitution,
59  V.  L. REv. 355,  384-85  (1973).  I assume  here,  as I shall  assume  there,  that this
due process challenge  will fail.
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statement  using  that notion which  both  describes  and justifies  on prin-
ciple  the  doctrine  that  all  civil  defendants,  but  not  civil  plaintiffs
generally,  are  entitled  to  relief  from  exclusionary  court  access  fees.
I  have  not  rigorously  proved  this  thesis,  but  I  believe  I  have  said
enough to make it persuasive.
2.  Of  Primary and Secondary Rights, Preventive and  Compensatory
Relief,  Active  and Passive State  Roles,  and Rightless Plaintiffs
Without  a  doubt,  the  "economic"  interpretation  of  legal  rules,
claims,  and  liabilities  (corresponding  roughly  with  what  I  have  been
calling  the  "deterrence"  perspective)  is,  though  controversial,  intel-
lectually  respectable.  It might  seem,  then,  that  a state  could  choose
to  organize  its  legal  system  in  accordance  with  the  economic  ap-
proach  without  running  afoul  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  due
process  clause.  The  utility  of  modest  fees  for  the  general  run  of
would-be  plaintiffs-not  excepting  functionally  indigent  would-be
plaintiffs for whom  the fees would be exclusionary-is  easily rational-
ized within  the  economic  approach. 115  If it turned  out that the same
could  not be  said of  divorce  plaintiffs  and  of  defendants  generally-
if  there  were  some  reason  why  rationing  their judicial  services  by
price is  exceptionally  dysfunctional-the  fee decisions  would stand ex-
plained.
Let us  glance  for  a moment  at what  may be  called  a  "pure de-
deterrence"  theory of law.  Devotees  of  such a theory  would have no
use for any notion of particular rights as  ethical imperatives  and would
assiduously  avoid  ever  relying  on  such  a  notion  in  legal  reasoning
or institution  building.  Legal  rules  of  entitlement  and  liability would
be  seen  as  having  the  sole  purpose  of  directing  conduct  away  from
socially  undesired  and  into  socially  desired  channels. 1 " 6  (Theorists
of  the  deterrence  school,  concerned  as  they tend to be with obviating
reliance  on  controversial  moral  views,  would  characteristically  define
social  desirability  in  standard  utilitarian  terms  of  maximizing  fulfill-
ment  of individual  preferences,  whatever  they  are.)  If individuals  are
sometimes  permitted  to  recover  specific  or  monetary  relief  in  law-
suits,  that  would  be  regarded  as but  a  device  for  motivating  those
thought  best  situated for  detecting  and  proving violations  of  some  of
the rules  to  act  as  policemen  and  prosecutors  for  those  violations.
Under such a pure version of deterrence theory, there would be no
115.  See note 110 supra &  text accompanying  notes 118-20  infra.
116.  For a necessary refinement, see note 73 supra.
117.  See, e.g., PosNER 78,  321.
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basis  for  preferring  the  court  access  rights  of  defendants  to  those  of
plaintiffs.  Where  monetary  relief  is  sought,  the  immediate  outcome
of  the  lawsuit  will  be  to  determine  whether  a  sum  of  money  is  to
change hands.  Since it plainly would  be absurd to suppose, as  a  gen-
eral  rule, that money  tends  to  generate  more welfare  in the  hands  of
defendants  than  in  the  hands  of  plaintiffs,  welfare-maximization
through  distribution  or  transfer  policy  cannot  dictate  a  preference
for  either  defendants  or  plaintiffs.  (Similar  reasoning  holds  where
specific  relief  is  sought:  we  cannot,  without  doing  a  cost-benefit  an-
alysis  of the  particular  case, say  whether  welfare  output  will be maxi-
mized  by  awarding  to  one  party  or  the  other  the  particular  "entitle-
ment"  in  controversy.)  Nor  can  any  such  preference  be  inferred
from  rule-based  resource-allocation  (deterrence)  policy.  If  an  indi-
gent  plaintiff  with  a valid  claim  is denied  access  by  an  exclusionary
fee,  a bit of  deterrence  potential will have been  dissipated  (or, as  de-
terrence  theorists  sometimes  say,  "externalized").  1  Precisely  the
same is true if an indigent defendant with a valid defense is priced  out
of  court appearance  and forced  into  a default. 19  Whether  the  result-
ing  dissipation  of deterrence  pressure  is worth the saving  of court  re-
sources  (which  the  fees  may  be  thought  also  to  effect)  from  being
wasted  on  frivolous  claims  and  defenses  is  a strictly prudential  judg-
ment,  not  involving  anyone's  rights  (since the  litigants  are  merely  in-
struments  of  society's  optimizing  machine);  and  this  judgment  is  not
at all likely to  differ according  to whether the  excluded prosecutor-liti-
gant is in the litigating posture of plaintiff or defendant. 20
From  this  simple  analysis  a  most significant  conclusion  follows:
by  its insistence  on  an  absolute right  of  court  access  for  defendants,
the Supreme  Court has evidently  located  in the  due  process  clause  the
view that there is more to life and the legal order than  economic maxi- mizing.  Defendants,  at  least,  may not  be  regarded  as  mere  soldiers
in  the  state's  prosecutorial  phalanx.  They  must  be  treated  as  the
holders of individual rights.
Interestingly,  there  seems  to be nothing  in this  view  of the four-
teenth  amendment  to  rouse  the  concern  of  the  contemporary  Ameri-
118.  See G. CALABRESI,  supra  note 73,  at 144.
119.  See  note 87 supra.
120.  See  text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
Coaceivably,  the  optimal arrangement  would  be one  which  sought to preserve  the
deterrence  potential  embodied  in indigent  claimants  and  defendants  (by  excusing  them
from  fees),  while  providing  some  administrative  substitute  for the  screening  function
ordinarily performed by fees.  Whether this plan is the optimal scheme  depends  on the
combined administrative  costs of (1)  identifying the indigent and  (2)  effectively  screen-
ing their claims  and defenses.
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can school of economic  analysts of law.  It probably is a mistake-and
it clearly would be gratuitous-to  ascribe  to those  analysts  such single-
mindedness  as  the  pure  deterrence  theory  embodies.  Their  general
outlook  can  accommodate  an  elementary  notion  of rights;  for  liberty
-the  realization  of  individual  preference-can  be  introduced  as  a
prime  value  in  deterrence  schemes  with  little  if  any  disturbance  to
claims  of moral "neutrality."'121  In what we can  call the ethical-deter-
rence  theory  of law,  to  distinguish  it from  the pure  deterrence  view,
each  person has  a right to have his  liberty unmolested  except  insofar
as interference  is justified  by a goal of  economic  optimization  or  "co-
ordination."' 1 22   There  may  be  a  true  ethical  imperative  behind  this
right;  it  may  be  seen  as  standing  outside  of  and  antecedent  to  the
deterrence  scheme.  Unjustified-which  is to  say  economically  or  in-
121.  Though  the  premise  that  the, only  ethical  imperative  consists  of  maximizing
realization  of  individual  preference  is  itself controversial,  and  in that  sense  not  "neu-
tral,"  that  premise  is  already  implicit  in  the  pure-deterrence  approach.  See  Hey-
mann,  The Problem of  Coordination: Bargaining and Rules,  86  HAv. L. Rlv.  797,
801-02  (1973).
122.  It  should be noted that the question  of "justification"  can become rather subtle.
In  accident  contexts  governed  by  negligence  doctrine,  "innocent"  (non-negligent,  cost-
justified)  injurers  are protected  against liability.  The opposite  is true  in  accident  con-
texts  governed  by  strict  liability,  in land-trespass  contexts,  and  in  breach  of  contract
contexts.  In all those  latter instances, liability is imposed  on the injurer  even when his
action  was  the  cost-justified,  the  economically  maximizing  choice  under  the  circum-
stances.  Why  is  it  "justifiable"  to encroach  on  the  liberty  of the  latter  cost-justified
injurers  (by  making  them  compensate  their  victims),  but  not  on  that  of  the  cost-
justified injurer  in a negligence  context?  Or, conversely,  why is  it justifiable  for cost-
justified injurers  to encroach  on their victims'  liberty  in negligence contexts,  but not in
strict  liability,  trespass,  or  breach  of  contract  contexts?  In  each  case,  an  answer  is
available which  rests on economic  optimization.  Trespassers  and contract  breakers  are
held  liable  despite  any  optimizing  effects  immediately  flowing  from  their  actions,  be-
cause  if trespassers  and  contract-breakers  are  allowed  to escape  liability on  a plea  of
cost-justification,  people  will be  deterred  from  investing  in land  or  entering  into  and
relying on  contracts.  And  those  effects  will  be  economically  detrimental  in  the  long
run.  It  can  be  argued,  then,  that trespassing  and  contract-breaking  are  never  cost-
justified  unless  accompanied  by  payment  of  compensation  to  the  victim.  Thus  the
victim of these acts who has not been compensated has been unjustifiably imposed upon,
and there is justification  for imposing liability  on those authors  of  such acts  who  have
refused  to pay  compensation.  But  this  reasoning  has  no  application  to  cost-justified
accidental  injuries  under  negligence  doctrine.  -See PosNER  98-99.  The  argument  re-
specting  strict liability is  related.  If a class  of activities  has been  submitted  to a strict
liability  regime,  the reason  (in  the economic  view)  must be  that imposing  the costs  of
this activity's  "unavoidable"  accidents  on  injurers  seems  to promise more  accident-cost
savings  over  the  long  run  than  imposing  those  costs  on  victims.  See  Posner,  Strict
Liability, supra note 87; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.  _LEGAL  STUDmS  29  (1972).
Hence  the  justification for  encroaching  on  the injurer's  liberty  by  holding  him  liable.
And  since  strict liability thus  commits  us to  the view  that allowing  injurers  to  escape
liability for accident costs is  an avoidable  invitation to economic  waste, it again follows
that an uncompensated  victim has been unjustifiably imposed on.
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stitutionally123   unnecessary-incursions  on  liberty  may  be  disfa-
vored intrinsically,  and not merely because they tend to be wasteful of
society's economic potential.
124
At  least  some  such  elemental  notion  of  rights,  I  say,  must
inhere  in  the  Court's  reading  of  due  process  as  an  absolute  guar-
123.  "Institutionally"  necessary  incursions  are  a  subcategory  of  "economically"
necessary  ones.  In  the  deterrence  perspective,  not  all  liability  rules  are  imposed  be-
cause  the conduct  they name  is  believed  economically  undesirable.  Some  are imposed
because the transactional structure which they  alone make possible is  believed economic-
ally  desirable.  See,  e.g.,  Heymann,  supra note  121,  at  834-43;  Michelman,  supra
note  83,  at 663-64.
124.  Cf.  Demsetz,  When  Does the Rule  of  Liability Matter?, 1  J.  LEGAL  STUDIES
13,  28  (1972):  "If  courts  are  to  ignore  wealth,  religion,  or  family  in  deciding
[tort  cases]  . . . then,  as  a  normative  proposition,  it  is  difficult  to  suggest  any
criterion  for  deciding  liability  other  than  placing  it  on  the  party  able  to  avoid  the
costly  interaction most  easily."  The  ethical-deterrence  attitude  may  be  implicit in the
legal order's  apparent  general preference  for a "negligence"  as opposed  to  a "strict  lia-
bility"  approach  as normally  appropriate  for accident law.  This apparent  preference  is
not  explained  by  Professor  Posner's  meticulous  and  cogent  argument  that  in  most
accident  contexts  there  is  no  basis  for  regarding  either  approach  as  superior  from  a
deterrence  point of view, in the  absence  of  empirical  data not now  available  and  per-
haps  unobtainable.  It might  seem  that  the  preference  could  nonetheless  be  explained
in  strictly economic  terms,  as  a means for  avoiding  where  possible  the  administrative
costs  of shifting  liabilities  from  victims  to  injurers-inasmuch  as  such  costs  would  be
incurred  in  a larger  number  of  cases  under strict liability  than under  negligence.  But
on a per-case basis  the administrative  costs  of shifting might well  be  lower under strict
liability;  and,  absent  reliable  and relevant  data,  there  is  no  way  of knowing  whether
total  shifting costs  are least under  the  negligence  system  of possibly  fewer,  administra-
tively  more  expensive  cases  or  under  the  strict  liability  system  of  possibly  more
numerous,  administratively  cheaper  cases.  It remains  possible  to  explain  the  apparent
bias  in  favor  of  negligence  as  a  reflection  of  a  base-line  ethical  commitment  to
liberty:  when  everything  else  is  in  equipoise  (or  unknown),  the  state  should  not
bestir itself to prevent an  agent from doing what  he prefers,  or even  to make him  pay
for  doing  it.  All  of these  points,  except  perhaps  the  last,  are  made  or suggested  by
Posner's  work  itself.  See  POSNER  92-95,  342-43;  Posner,  Strict Liability, supra note
87,  at  209,  211-12,  215-17,  220;  Posner, Negligence, supra note  122,  at  32,  33,  41-42.
One  commentator,  asserting that  "the first task  of the law  of torts is  to define  the
boundaries  of  individual  liberty"  (an  assertion  in which  I  do  not find  any  necessary
contradiction  of Posner's  position),  goes  on to  argue  for the  proposition  that "the  lib-
erty  of  one  person  ends  when  he  causes  harm  to  another,"  meaning  by  this  that  in-
jurers  (actors)  should  always  be liable  to victims  (recipients).  Epstein,  A  Theory  of
Strict Liability, 2 J.  LEGAL  STrUDIs  151,  203-04  (1973).  In  Posner's  version,  the  an-
alyst  should  ask this question:  Why is it not  equally  true that  one  person's  boundar-
ies,  defining  what  counts  as  a  harm  to  that  person,  end  when  insistence  on  those
boundaries  would  restrict  the  liberty  of  another?  Why  the  bias  in favor  of  victims?
See  Posner, Strict Liability, supra note  87,  at 215-16.  If the  bias is  rejected,  and  the
suggestion  of  ethical  reciprocity  between  injurers  and  victims  accepted  (whether  one
ought  to  accept  it need  not be  decided  right  here-Epstein's  point  is  that  one  ought
not),  then  liberties  and  boundaries  coalesce  into  indistinguishable  entities;  and
economic  justification may  well  be  allowed  the  ethical  function  of  determining  whose
liberties/boundaries  would be violated-the  injurer's  were he held  liable or the victim's
were he denied compensation.  Compare PosNnR 99-100.
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anty  of  defendants'  access.  To  be  sure,  that  conclusion  is  not  logi-
cally compelled:  due process could be seen as itself a kind of economic
higher  law,  reflecting  the Framers'  conviction  that in  the  long  run  a
requirement that defendants be heard is the socially efficient solution.125
But it is at least a little odd to think of the Constitution  as having been
designed  to override  the economic judgments  of sitting  legislatures.
126
More immediately  to  the point, under such  a pure  economic  interpre-
tation  of  procedural  due  process,  it  is  not  apparent  why  efficiency
does  not  similarly  dictate  a  requirement  that  plaintiffs  be  heard.1
2 7
At first  glance  it might  seem  that  the rights-centered  variant  of
the  deterrence  perspective  also  lacks  differentiating  power.  An  al-
leged  injurer's right not to be molested by a judgment or decree  unless
the plaintiff  has  a valid  (deterrence-inspired)  cause  of action  seems to
be mirrored  by  a victim's  right not  to  have been  molested by  the in-
jurer's  conduct  unless  the injurer  has  a valid  (deterrence-inspired)  de-
fense. 2 8   We  can  see how  the  injurer's  right  argues  for  guarantying
every  defendant  a hearing.  But  the parallel  argument  for  victims  is
less  sure,  at  least  where  the  relief  sought  is  a  compensatory  money
judgment,  for  plaintiffs  and  defendants  do  not  occupy  symmetrical
positions  with respect to the monetary  relief which  may result from  a
lawsuit.
A  lawsuit  places  the defendant's  liberty  in direct  and  immediate
jeopardy.  An  erroneous,  adverse  judgment  (including  a  fee-induced
default  judgment  undeserved  on  the  merits)  will  itself  constitute  a
molestation  violating  the  defendant's  rightful  liberty.  The  plaintiff's
situation  is  less  clear-cut.  A  correct  judgment  in his  favor  will,  no
doubt,  establish that  his  rightful liberty-mirroring  and  corresponding
to  that  liberty  of  a  defendant  which  every  lawsuit  jeopardizes-had
previously  been  directly  and  immediately  violated  by  the  defendant's
conduct.  Thus,  an  "erroneous"  refusal  to  grant  that  judgment  (in-
cluding  a refusal based  on the plaintiff's  fee-induced  "default"  in filing
125.  See PosNur  334.
126.  But see id. at 266-67.
127.  The  danger  that  plaintiffs  will  waste  resources  by  asserting  frivolous  or  ex-
tortionate  claims  seems  not  greatly  different  from  the  danger  that  defendants  will
waste  resources  by setting  up frivolous  or extortionate  defenses.  And  just  as the  sys-
tem  of pretrial  motions  (for judgment  on the  pleadings  or summary  judgment)  seems
designed  to limit  the  latter  danger,  so  does  a parallel  system  of  pretrial  motions  (to
dismiss)  seem  designed  to  limit the  former.  The  frivolous-litigation  problem  will  be
further discussed in  Part II.
128.  This  is most  obvious  where  the  victim  has  suffered  an  intentional,  physical
violation  of his person  or possessions,  analogous  to what the  defendant  will  sustain  in
the  event  of  execution  of  a judgment  against  him.  But  the  principle  has,  I  believe,
broader applications.  See text accompanying notes  191-98  infra.
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suit) will  deny him  a factually  warranted  determination  of  prior viola-
tion of his rights.  But  perhaps  the plaintiff  does not have  a right  to
that  retrospective  determination  in  as  compelling  a  sense  as  the  de-
fendant  now  has  an  anticipatory  right  not  to  be  unjustifiably  mo-
lested.  Could  the Supreme  Court possibly  be  influenced  by  any  such
thought  in  favoring  the  hearing  rights  of  defendants  over  those  of
plaintiffs?  (Of  course,  it  will  not  work  for  plaintiffs  seeking  pre-
ventive relief.  But what about money-damage actions?)
One earnestly  hopes not.  Such a cavalier  attitude  towards  claims
for compensation would be highly controversial in our jurisprudential tra-
dition.129  In that tradition there is an important strain which would find
ethically  opprobrious  any  molestation  of  a  civil  defendant  for  the
sake of social-welfare objectives  or of any other objectives,  save satisfy-
ing  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  be  compensated. 1 80  In  a  radically
different  perspective,  economic  theorists  themselves  express  baffle-
ment  at  the notion  that  compensation  is  not  simply  a restoration  of
property or liberty wrongfully taken.  131
There  is  at  least  one  powerful,  traditional  tendency,  in  which
the Supreme  Court has participated,  which  rather strongly  intimates  a
view  that compensatory relief  occupies  no less high  a plane  of  ethical
importance  than the primary  right  whose  violation  demands  requital.
Courts  have  frequently  allowed  plaintiffs  bringing  private  actions  to
recover  damages  for  injuries  caused  by violations  of prohibitory  stat-
utes,  even  though  the legislative  authors  have  made  no provision  for
private  recovery,  but  only  for  penal  or  preventive  enforcement
at the behest  of public  authorities.  Such  "implications"  of compensa-
tory private rights have  arisen in regard to an impressive variety of stat-
129.  See  T. Swnowlc,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  MEAsuE  OF  DMYAGES  28,  31  (1847)
(no  legal  right  without  a  remedy);  id.  ch.  II  (nominal  damages).  "Mhe  primary
right to  a  satisfaction for  injuries  is  given  by  the  law  of  nature,  and the  suit  is  only
the means of ascertaining  and  recovering  that  satisfaction  ...  ."  2  W.  BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARE S  *438.  "Mhe  injured  party  has  unquestionably  a  vague  and  inde-
teriinate  right  to some  damages  or other, the  instant  he  receives  the  injury;  and  the
verdict  of the jurors,  and  the judgment  of the  court thereupon,  do  not in  this  case  so
properly  vest  a new  title  in  him,  as fix  and  ascertain  the  old one;  they  do not  give,
but  define,  the  right."  Id.  See  also J.  RAWLS,  supra note  80,  at  240  (relationship
between availability of remedies and "stability of social cooperation").
130.  Cf. 1.  KANT,  supra note 88,  at 36-37, 65,  77.
131.  Indeed,  the  economic  approach  has a particular tendency  to view  the remedial
(compensatory)  claim  as often  itself  the primary  "right."  Often  what  one  has  is  not
a  "right"  that  others  shall  refrain  from  doing  x  (implying  a  claim  to  preventive  re-
lief),  but rather  a  "right"  to  be  compensated  for  injuries  caused  by  anyone  doing  x.
This will  be  the case whenever  recognition  of a preventive  right  (or "property  right,"
cf. Calabresi  & Melamed,  supra note  84,  at  1092)  would be  economically  unsound  be-
cause it occasions  excessive transaction costs.  See POSNER 276, 320.
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utory  prohibitions,  including  securities-regulation  laws' 32  and  zoning
laws.'
33
One  can  attempt  to  explain  this  phenomenon  strictly  within  the
deterrence vision of the legal order, but the results  are not compelling.
Where  the  only sanction  provided  by  statute  is  a penal  one,  the most
inviting  economic  account  would be  that while  damage  recoveries' are
designed  to  serve  the  basic  deterrent  function,  the  total  volume  of
deterrence  they  generate  has  been  deemed  inadequate-possibly  be-
cause not  everyone  harmed by  the  restricted  line  of  activity  is  either
motivated  to  sue  or  able  to  sue  successfully.'
3 4   Supposedly,  the
criminal  penalties  are  meant  to  fill  the resulting  deterrence  gap.  A
critical  weakness  in this  account  is its supposition  that  the  legislature
has  calibrated  the  penalties  in  the  manner  described-a  seemingly
baseless  assumption  where  the  legislature  has  not  openly  adverted  to
the possibility  of  civil  actions.  The account,  in  short,  is  circular:  it
justifies  the  inference  of  civil  liability  by  imaginings  about  how  the
legislature  might  have  gone  about  its  job  of  calibrating  penalties  if
the legislature had  intended civil liability.  Another  deterrence  theorist
might momentarily  slip his moorings  and  argue that by flatly prohibit-
ing a line  of  conduct  and making it criminal,  the legislature  expressed
its  purpose  of  stopping  the  activity  cold.  Since  some  violations  in-
evitably  slip  through  the  net  of  penal  law  enforcement,  he  would
add,  it is  plainly  consistent  with  the  legislative  design to  employ  civil
actions  as a backstop.  But his colleagues would  quickly point out that
you  have  to  take the  legislature  seriously  and  that when it  sets  up  a
deterrence system  whose actual  effect is  to  cut back on  a line of activ-
ity to  a degree short of totality,  the legislature  presumably  regards  just
that degree of reduction as socially optimal. 35
132.  See  .1.  Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426  (1964).
133.  See  Schwartz,  The Logic  of Home  Rule  and  the Private Law  Exception,  20
U.C.L.A.L.  REv. 671,  706-07,  709  (1973).
134.  See  POSNER  68,  358,  where  Professor Posner suggests  another  reason  why  civil
damage  liability  might  provide  inadequate  deterrence:  Why  is  theft  made  criminal?
After-the-fact  external  evaluations  by  judges  and  juries  are  less  accurate  than  the
parties'  own  evaluations  as reflected  in a voluntary  transaction  between  them.  There-
fore, in regard to all  situations  in which  voluntary  transactions  are feasible  without ex-
cessive  transaction  costs,  societal  savings  might  be  effected  by  preventing  unilateral
substitution  of  the  less  accurate  adjudicatory  evaluation  for the  more  accurate  market
evaluation.
135.  Cf. PosNER,  358-59,  365-67.  Of  course,  in some  of these contexts  (but by no
means  all),  the  most  plausible  inference  will  be  that  although  the  legislature  would
have wanted  total  elimination  if  elimination  (law  enforcement)  were  costless  (see  note
134  supra), the  lawmakers  have  concluded  that  after  a  point  the  marginal  costs  of
enforcement  exceed  the marginal savings  thereby  effected.  In those  situations, it might
seem  that additional  deterrence  through  civil  actions  can  only be  welcome.  But  what
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For a like  reason,  the deterrence  theorist  will have  difficulty  ex-
plaining the  implication  of  a civil  damage  recovery  where  the  legisla-
ture  has  provided  only  for  preventive  sanctions  under  the  control  of
public  officers.  Preventive  sanctions  may seem  to imply, more  clearly
than penal  ones,  a  legislative  purpose of  dead-stopping  the  target  ac-
tivity.  But  law  enforcement  budgets  are  also  a  legislative  output,
and  administrative  officials  are  accountable  to  the  legislature.  If,
therefore,  budgetary  constraints  and  administrative  policy  lead  to  se-
lective  or  incomplete  prevention,  that  outcome  must  be  ascribed  to
the legislature.1 36
Then  what  are  we  to  make  of  a  court's  insistence  on  throwing
the  legislature's  preferred  balance  of  incentives  out  of  whack  (for
aught  the  court  can  tell)  by  "implying"  civil  damage  recoveries?
Does  it  not  seem  that  the  court  (and  through  the  court,  the  legal
order)  is  exhibiting  more  concern  about  rights-specifically,  rights
to  be  compensated-than  about  incentives?  Does  it  not  seem  as
though  the  court's  premise  is  that  one  just  has  a  right  to  be  com-
pensated  when his boundaries  (however  the  legislature  chooses  to  de-
fine them)  are crossed? 137  And that this notion  of right, in fact, is  so
deep-seated  as  to  override  the  undoubted  societal  goal  of  economic
maximization?
138
about  the  costs  of  those  actions  (which  of  course  are  social  as  well  as  private)?
Since  the  legislature  has  forborne  to  provide  for  private  actions,  what  justifies  the
inference  that it thought their  costs  worth  incurring?  An economic  analyst might  say
the  worth of  such  costs is  demonstrated  by  the very  willingness  of  people  to shoulder
them  privately.  But  this  view  seems  incorrect  since  a  significant  share  of  litigation
costs  is borne  by the taxpaying public,  presumably because  deterrence  and  effectuation
are recognized  as partially public goods.  See  Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
Functional  Analysis, 86 1{ARv.  L. REv.  645, 670-71  (1973);  POSNER  322-23.
136.  For  a  discussion  that  serves  to  complete  the  argument,  see  note  135  supra.
The  argument  tends  to  contradict  Professor  Schwartz's  apparent  view  that  allowing
private  injunction  suits  for  statutory  violations  implies  no  private  right  but  only  en-
listment  of the private  suitor in the public's  deterrence  program.  See  Schwartz,  supra
note  133,  at 706  n.181.  Allowance  of such suits  tends  to upset  the kinds  of  legislative
balances  discussed  in  the  text  and,  in  that  light,  reflects  a  notion  of  private  rights
irrespective of imputed  deterrence programs.
137.  Cf.  Bivens  v.  Six  Unknown  Named  Agents  of  Federal  Bureau  of  Narcotics,
403  U.S.  388  (1971).
138.  Compare the  concept  of  "rights"  offered  by  another  writer:  "I  shall  say  that
an  individual  has  a  right to  a particular  political  act  [e.g., to  be  awarded  damages],
within  a political  theory,  if the  failure  to provide  the  act,  when he  calls  for it,  would
be unjustified within that theory even if the  goals of the theory  [e.g.,  economic  optimi-
zation]  would,  on  the  balance,  be disserved  by that act."  Dworkin,  supra note  88,  at
520.
The  text's  suggested  account  of  private  damage  recoveries  for statutory violations
seems  especially  compelling  when  the  violated  enactment  is  a  municipal  ordinance.
There exists  a traditional  reluctance  to believe  that it is  appropriate  for municipal  gov-
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When  all is said  and done, there  seems  to be no license either in
the  Constitution  or  in  any  established  jurisprudential  tradition  for re-
garding  specific,  preventive  relief  (that which  a defendant  always  re-
quires)  as  more  important  than  monetary,  compensatory  relief  (that
which  plaintiffs  often  require)--"more  important,"  that  is,  in  the
sense  that  an  erroneous  withholding  of  specific  relief  is  the worse  or
more regrettable sort of event.
There  yet  remains  one  reason  which  might be  given  for  prefer-
ring  defendants'  access  rights  to  those  of  plaintiffs-even,  indeed,  of
plaintiffs  seeking  preventive  relief.  Is  there  not  a  difference  between
the  two  situations  with respect  to the  quality  of the  state's  contribu-
tion to the risk of violation of the would-be litigant's rights?  Should an
erroneous  judgment  be  enforced  against  a  defaulting  defendant,  the
state  itself  will  have  committed  an  unjustified  molestation.  Is  that
not  a  worse,  a  more  pernicious,  type  of  behavior  on  its  part  than
merely  failing to come  to the aid  of  a plaintiff whose  rights  are being
(or have been) violated by someone else?
Well, why  is it worse?  Why should we feel worse about it?  (We
are not,  be it noted,  confronted here  with any  technical  "state  action"
problem;  for  the  state's  insistence  on its  access  fees  will  amply  bring
the  excluded  plaintiff's  grievance  within  the  "No  state  shall  . . ."
phraseology  of  the fourteenth  amendment.)'8 9  But is  it not possible
that,  without  being  able  precisely  to  say why  one  should  feel  worse
about  the  state's  actively  risking  a violation  of  rights  than  about  its
passively  risking  failure  to  correct  a violation  committed by  another,
defenders  of  the  Court's  defendant/plaintiff  line  could  nevertheless
connect  that  line  with  a  deep-seated  instinct  in  our  legal  and  ethical
tradition-that  which  looks  more  searchingly  at  active  than  at  pas-
sive  behavior?14 0  Here  at last  we meet  a ground of distinction which
can  claim  a degree  of resonance  with  a  pervasive  tenet  of  the  legal
tradition.
But this ground,  too,  gives way upon close inspection.  Its weak-
ness  is not in the  claim  of  an  entrenched  tendency  to  distinguish be-
tween  active and passive behavior  and treat the  former  as more liabil-
erning  bodies  to  define  people's  rights,  although  these  bodies  are  to  varying  degrees
authorized to regulate  in the interests  of  deterrence  or resource  allocation.  See  gener-
ally  Schwartz,  supra note  133.  Yet  when  municipalities  engage  in  deterrent  regula-
tion,  courts  (insofar  as  they  allow  reliance  on  these  regulations  in  civil  damage
actions)  insist  they  have  ipso  facto  wrought  a  redefinition  of  rights.  Compare id.
at 706.
139.  This matter is further discussed in Part II.
140.  See,  e.g.,  Epstein,  supra note  124,  at  189-204  (discussion  of  "Good  Samari-
tans").
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ity-prone  (for  I readily  concede  the  truth  of  that  claim),  but in  the
assumption  that the  state's  treatment  of  the  excluded  plaintiff  is  ap-
propriately  classed  as passive.  For,  as  I shall  explain,  there is  an im-
portant  and  traditional  jurisprudential  perspective  in  which  the  state
must be regarded  as  interfering  actively  with the rights  of the would-
be  plaintiff  from  whom  it  withholds  relief  without  a  hearing;  and,
just  as in  the  case  of the  comparison  between  specific  and  compensa-
tory relief, the Court has no detectable  license  (nor has  it  even begun
to suggest any reason) for rejecting this view.
The traditional  perspective  I have in mind is  the  "natural right,"
"social  contract" view which  regards  litigation  as  a state-imposed  sub-
stitute  for  the  troublesome  right  of  self-help  which  would  prevail  in
the  state  of  nature.141  For  clarity's  sake,  assume  that  the  excluded
plaintiff  has  a  legally  valid  cause  of  action-that  if  given  a judicial
hearing, he would be held  entitled to  relief.142  It follows  that he is  a
person whose  rightful liberty,  as  the state  itself  has  seen  fit to  define
that liberty, has been violated. 1 4 3   Still for the sake of  clarity,  assume
that the violated interest is one universally protected by law throughout
the Western  world:  the defendant,  let us  suppose,  is  intentionally  and
repeatedly  vandalizing  the  plaintiff's  home.  For  a  final  simplifying
assumption,  we  can  imagine  that  the  plaintiff  is  seeking  preventive
relief  which  would  ordinarily  be  available  under  the  circumstances
described.'
44
Any similarly  situated victim  able  to pay court  access  fees  would
obtain  the  desired  relief.  It would  be  naturally  and  commonly  said
that his recovery reflects  a right on his part not to be  molested  in  the
manner  described  and  (or including)  a right  to relief  against the  mo-
lestation.  The  Supreme  Court's  Boddie  dicta  regarding  defendants
imply,  as we have seen,  an ability to appreciate  this view, inasmuch  as
our  plaintiff's  right  (or rights)  must be seen  as  mirroring  those  which
defendants  assert  when  insisting  on protection  against  the  entry  of er-
roneous judgments against them. 45
141.  For a searching exploration of this view,  see R. NozicK, supra note 91,  ch. 5.
142.  This  merely  parallels  the  simplifying  assumption  which  must  be  made  for  a
defendant  in  order  to  appreciate  that his  rightful  liberty  is  at stake  when  he  is  sued.
In  subsequent discussion I shall revert  to the more  accurate  locutions  of risk  and prob-
ability.  See text accompanying notes 149-50 infra.
143.  I  reserve  for  later  discussion  the  question  of  whether  every  recognition  or
definition  by the state  of  a legal  cause  of  action must be  construed  as a definition  of
rightful liberties.  See text accompanying  notes 193-98 infra.
144.  I  have  already  given  my  reasons  for  believing  that  money-damage  cases
cannot tenably be distinguished.  See text accompanying  notes  129-38 supra.
145.  See text accompanying notes  120-27 supra.
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Now  just  what would people  be  thinking  of,  or meaning,  when
they  described  the  protected  defendant  or  the  recovering  victim  as
the  holder of a "right'?  How  can  we specify  the ethically  imperative
or normative  sense in which "right" is evidently used in such a locution?
To begin with, we  seem to be  talking  about  relationships  among
persons in society.  We do not mean  a claim or expectation  that  God
shall  arrange  things  so  that  one's  rightful  interests  will  never  be
violated,  but  a  claim  against  other  persons  that  they  shall  respect
those  interests.  But the  notion of  a right  clearly  is not  the same  as
that of a mere normative appeal to others; the former  idea  conveys  a
stricter sense of personal prerogative.
Perhaps  we  can  specify  an  irreducible  minimum  content  for  the
common notion of a right in ethico-legal discourse by means of the fol-
lowing paradigm.  Consider a series of statements:
1.  You  have  a  right  that  no  one  (or  no  one  who  belongs  to
some  class)  shall  do  x  (assault you,  or  take  away  your  property,  or
break his promise to you, or whatever).
2.  You are entitled to stop a person from doing x.140
3.  You  are  entitled  to  require  the state  to stop  a  person from
doing x.
4.  You are entitled to punish a person for doing x.
5.  You  are  entitled to require  the state  to  punish  a person  for
doing x.
6.  You  are entitled  to  extract compensation  from a person who
harms you by doing x.147
7.  You  are  entitled  to require the state  to  extract  compensation
for you from a person who harms you by doing x.
Now statement 1, I suggest,  entails the truth of at least one of the
statements  2 -through 7.  It  is  quite  commonly  the  case  that  state-
ments 2, 4, 5,  and 6  are false.  But whenever  those statements  are  all
false, statement  1 is  also false unless at least one of statements  3  and 7
is true.  But the proposition that at least  one of 3 and 7 is true is pre-
146.  To "stop"  means  to take whatever measures  may  be  actually necessary  to that
end.  To  be  "entitled"  to  stop  means  both that  some  such  measures  exist  which  are
practical  as  well  as prudent  and that you may take  them without subjecting yourself to
punishment  or  civil  liability.  I  say  that  available  measures  must  be  prudent  and
practical  in  order  to make  clear  that  the  entitlement  is not  satisfied  by  showing,  for
example,  that  a person could  effectively  prevent others  from  assaulting  him by  adopt-
ing the lawful expedient of becoming a hermit.
147.  Again,  to be "entitled  to extract" means  that you may do  whatever  is necessary
to obtain the compensation,  and at no risk of criminal or civil liability.
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cisely  the  proposition  which  entitles  you  to  maintain  a  civil  action
leading  to  injunctive  or  compensatory  relief  against  the  doing  of  x.
Such relief, then,  is something  the state owes you,  as  long  as  1 is true
and 2, 4,  5,  and 6  are not.  Not to give a person what is  owed him is
not, of course,  to  act "passively"  in  any  sense in which  passive beha-
vior  has  ever  been  thought  (or  felt)  to  be  legally  or  morally  less
suspect  than  active  behavior.1 48  We  cannot  coherently  say  that  you
have a right not to be  trespassed  against  and that the state  acts  pass-
ively in refusing both to grant you relief  against trespasses  and to per-
mit your resort to punitive  or reparative  self-help  when  your prudent
attempts  at prevention have failed.  And we have no basis for denying
that you have such a right, once we both have  conceded that some per-
sons  in  some  situations  do have  rights  and  have  observed  that  the
state  generally  recognizes  a  cause  of  action  to  obtain  relief  against
trespasses.
149
Thus,  reverting  to  the  case  of  petitioner  A,  the  civil  plaintiff
who  had his  car repossessed,  in my introductory  story,  we realize  that
the  state  has been  passive  there  only  if A  has  suffered  no  violations
of  his  rights.  But that  is  an  impossible  thing  to  say  except  on  the
pure  deterrence  view  that  no  one  has  any  rights.  And  that  view
seems  unavailable  to the Supreme Court for at least  three reasons:  (1)
the  populace  would  find  it downright  weird;  (2) it is  extremely  con-
troversial  amongst  jurisprudential  thinkers,  past  and  present,  who  lie
well  within  our  legal tradition;  and  (3)  the  Court itself  has  rejected
it in countless  due  process  decisions,  protecting  the rights  of  defend-
ants.
The  seeming  difference  in  the  state's  treatment  of  plaintiffs
and  defendants  thus  becomes  obscure.  A state which  excludes  a de-
fendant  from  the  litigation  forum  may  be  seen  to  create  a  severe
risk  that  its  enforcement  of  a  default  judgment  against  him  will
directly violate his rights.  A state which  excludes  a plaintiff from the
litigation forum may be seen to take just as severe  a risk that its failure
to  aid  the  plaintiff  directly  violates  his  rights.  Even  if we  say  that
the  plaintiff's  violated  rights  are  merely  "remedial,"  and  somehow
conclude  that remedial  rights  are  of inferior  importance  as  compared
with primary  rights  from  which  they  are  differentiated,  it seems  im-
possible  to  see  the  state  as  treating  the  excluded  defendant  "worse"
148.  See,  e.g.,  T.  PLucENTr,  A  CONCISE  HISTORY  OF  THE  COMmON  LAw  468-72
(5th  ed.  1956).
149.  If your right is conceived  as just a right to be compensated  for injuries  caused
by the doing of x, rather than  as a right that x  not be  done  (see  note  131  supra), my
argument is simplified but no less valid.
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than the  excluded  plaintiff.  The  excluded  defendant's  primary  rights
may be violated;  if so, it will be the  state that violates them.  The ex-
cluded  plaintiff may  already  have had his  primary rights violated.  It
was not the state doing that violating, but the state now risks violating
his  remedial  rights  and thereby imposing on  him the continued viola-
tion  of his primary rights.  For were  it not  for  the  state's  violation
of his remedial rights, the victim's primary rights would now be vindi-
cated.  The  state,  accordingly,  becomes  responsible  for  the  primary
violation,  too.  That  a wrongdoer  is responsible  for  all the proximate
consequences  of  the  wrongful  act  is  no  less  entrenched  an  attitude
in our law than the  concept that active is  more suspicious  than passive
behavior.1 10  So, while the state risks  injuring the  excluded  defendant,
in the case of the excluded  plaintiff it risks  not only injury,  but injuri-
ous insult to boot.
C.  DrVORCE  vis-A-vis  OTHER  CLAIMS
1.  Marriage  and the Rest of Life
The  discussion  in  the  last  section,  while  designed  to  show  that
the  distinction  between  defendants  in  general  and  plaintiffs  in gener-
al is largely  illusory,  does at  the same  time  shed light  on  the  Court's
urge  to  class  together  the predicaments  of  the Boddie divorce  suitors
and of defendants in general.
Insofar  as  anyone  is  tempted  to  distinguish  defendants  from
plaintiffs on the  ground that the  primary rights of defendants,  but not
those  of  plaintiffs,  are placed  in  direct  jeopardy  by  exclusion  from  a
litigation forum,  the Baddie situation  apparently  falls  on  the  "defend-
ants" side of the line; for the relief sought by the  petitioners there  was
precisely  a release  from existing shackles  on their freedom  of  action.",-
Moreover,  while  it  may  be plausible  to  explain  most civil  actions  as
pieces  of a grand  deterrence  design  (and thus  avoid  any need  to  infer
a "right"  on  the  plaintiff's  part from  the  fact  of  legal  recognition  of
his  cause  of  action),  to  think  of  divorce  suits  in  that  way  requires
strenuous  mental  acrobatics.152  Accordingly,  one  could  imagine  the
150.  Of course  the concept of  "proximity"  is not free  of  ambiguity.  But proximity
is hardly in  doubt in this case.  The express purpose of the state's obligation  is precisely
to  prevent or repair the  violation of  the victim's  primary  right.  Cf. Hadley  v. Baxen-
dale, 9  Exch. 341  (1854).
151.  But  the  criterion  of  immediate  involvement  of  primary  rights  will  not  re-
liably  distinguish  Boddie from  other  cases  where  plaintiffs  seek  specific  relief.  Con-
sider again the case  of  a person wishing  to sue  for injunction  against  poisoning  of the
atmosphere that blankets his residence.
152.  It  is  easily  thinkable  that  the legal  order  would  wish  to  create  "sanctions"  to
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Court  reasoning  (or  feeling)  that  insofar  as  state  law  creates  a  di-
vorce  cause  of  action,  it  must  thereby  mean  to  recognize  the  ag-
grieved  spouse's  right,  under  the  described  circumstances,  to  be  free
of the marriage.
1 5 3   The divorce  suitor  would  then  seem  to  resemble
the usual  defendant in having  at stake a right and not merely a prose-
cutorial function.
Finally,  it  may  seem  intuitively  clearer  as  to  excluded  divorce
suitors  than  as  to  other excluded  plaintiffs that the state is responsible
for  an  active violation  of rights  which  the  state  itself has recognized,
and  not merely  for a passive  failure  to  assist  in  correcting  violations
committed  by  others.  For  the  state  is  the  author  of  both  the  rules
imposing  special  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  married  persons
and  the  rule  forbidding  self-help  retrieval  of  one's  liberty  from
the  grip of those restrictions,  even when one  has a right  (as  conceived
by the state itself) to have one's liberty back.
But of course the state has likewise largely preempted the self-help
opportunities  of  the  victims  of  torts,  breaches  of  contract,  and
breaches  of trust.  And this observation  easily  suggests a close  analogy
between the  state's  treatment of the rights  of divorce  suitors  and those
of  other  plaintiffs:  in both instances,  the  state  insists  on injecting  its
own  adjudicative  and  enforcement  process  into  an  aggrieved  per-
son's  quest for vindication  of his  acknowledged  rights,  presumably be-
cause  of  concern  about the risks  of disorder  and possibly  about  other
dangers  to  the  interests  of  unrepresented  persons,1 54  thought  to  ac-
company the use of self-help.' 5
"deter"  the  classes  of  behavior  constituting  the  legal  grounds  for  divorce,  but  it  is
hardly  thinkable that divorce  is the  sanction that would be chosen.  Nor  can any  credi-
ble  economic  design  be  discovered  in  the  scheme  of  allowing  legally  aggrieved
spouses-but  not  other  spouses-to  "set  up  a  market  transaction"  (in  what  com-
modity?)  by  threatening  exercise  of  the  qualified  right  to  exit  from  the  marriage.
153.  "Feeling"  is  probably  the  more  accurate  participle.  It  is  always  imaginable
that  the legislature  simply  determined  (or,  in its  turn,  felt)  that  social  welfare  would
be  maximized  by  allowing  the  aggrieved  spouse  to  be  released  in  the  statutorily  de-
fined situations.
154.  This concern  about the rights of the unrepresented  seems especially plausible  in
the  context  of  divorce.  An  obvious  symptom  of  the  concern  is  just  the  feature
of the divorce  context  that made  the Supreme  Court feel that  divorce  was  "different":
that  is,  the  requirement  of judicial  action  even  where  both  spouses  agree  to  divorce.
See  text accompanying  note 27 supra.
155.  My  point-that  the  state's  withholding  of  judicial  assistance  from  victims
of private  wrongs  is not  different  enough  from  its  denial  of  analogous  assistance  to
victims  of  "wrongful"  marriages  to justify the  conclusion that  the  latter  action but  not
the  former  denies  due  process-is  distinct  from,  though  closely  related  to,  Professor
Goodpaster's  suggestion  that  legal  proscriptions  of  self-help  amount  to  "state  action"
sufficient  to  bring  such  withholdings  of  relief  within  reach of  the  fourteenth  amend-
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Those who  persist in feeling that the  divorce  situation is  somehow
"special"  have open  to  them one last possibility  of explaining  and  de-
fending  that feeling-a  possibility  hinted  at by  the  Court through  its
repeated  harping  on  marriage (as  distinguished  from  liberation  from
an undesired and legally vulnerable  marriage)  as  a "fundamental inter-
est"  at stake  in the Boddie case. 156  Perhaps  Boddie can fruitfully  be
regarded  as  a "substantive"  due process  case, rather than-as we have
been  regarding  it up  to now-as  a  case  posing  a  "procedural"  prob-
lem about the circumstances  under which an aggrieved party is entitled
to a judicial hearing.  Let us see what happens if we try:
One has an important interest  117 in being  able to get married-in
domesticating with the partner of one's choice under the blessing of the
legal  order.  But while  the  state  of being  married  is  highly  desirable
to many,  and  carries  important  advantages,  it  also  carries  important
hazards-in  particular,  the  hazard  that  a  marriage  will  "go  bad"  to
the  point  where  one  has  both  a  strong  desire  and  legal  right  to  get
free of it.
One has also,  then,  an important  interest in being  able to  escape
from  a bad  marriage.  Now  what  Connecticut  had  done  to  persons
wishing to  marry  was  this:  the state  had conditioned  their  enjoyment
of their important interest in getting  married upon submission  to  a re-
gime  in which their important  interest  in getting  unmarried  would  be
conditioned upon payment of a fee.  That is, full enjoyment  of all their
important  interests  connected  with marriage  (consisting  of being  able
to get  married with  assurance that you can  get unmarried  if the  need
should  arise),  was  conditioned  on prospective  ability to  pay  a fee.  A
slightly  different  statement  is  that  persons  could not  undertake enjoy-
ment of their important marital  interest free  of the burden  of  a  certain
unwelcome  prospect-that  they  might  be stuck  with a  bad marriage,
one  from which release would be  disallowed because  the spouses  could
not afford the state's price for release.
Now  let  us  consider,  instead  of  one's  interest  in  getting  mar-
ried, another interest which will generally be conceded  to be important.
Let us  use  the word "live"  to  signify  engagement  in the round of  ac-
tivities that adds up to one's being a productive and self-respecting  par-
ticipant  in  civil  society.  Like  getting  married,  "living"  is in  the  eyes
ment  due process  clause.  See  Goodpaster,  supra note  102,  at 223,  251.  1  shall  sug-
gest a different approach to the state action issue in Part 1I.
156.  Of  course,  the  Court  may  simply  have  been  thinking  that  you  have  to  get
unhitched before you may get hitched again.
157.  I  forbear  from  saying  "fundamental"  or  "constitutionally  protected"  interest
for  reasons  explained  at  length  below.  See  text  accompanying  notes  162-86  infra.
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of many  a highly desirable  activity;  and,  like  getting married,  it is  ac-
companied  by  certain  grave  risks.  If  you  are  going  to  "live,"  you
are  going  to  court  the  risk  that  your  boundaries  will  be  crossed-
that you  will be unjustifiably  molested. 8   One  way  of counteracting
the risk  of boundary-crossings  is to  be prepared  to use  self-help  either
to  prevent  a threatened  crossing  or to  exact  requital in  case  preven-
tion  fails.  However,  it  is a  condition  imposed  by the  state  upon  the
"privilege'  of living that you may not normally use punitive  or repara-
tive  self-help.  Rather  you  must  invoke  the  state's  assistance  by  be-
coming  a  plaintiff  in  a lawsuit.  If that  assistance  is  conditioned  on
your  payment  of  a  fee,  then  enjoyment  of  your  interest  in  living
is  burdened  by the  unwelcome  prospect  that your  boundaries  will  be
crossed  with impunity whenever  prevention  by lawful  means  is  imprac-
tical  and you lack  the price  of vindication  through law.  It becomes
true  of  living,  as  of  marrying,  that  you  cannot  undertake  to  do  it
unburdened  by  the  prospect  that  it  will  bring  you  to  serious  grief,
namely, the defenselessness of your boundaries.
How  can  it  be  said  that  what  the  state  accomplishes  by  the
combination  of  prohibitions  on punitive  and reparative  self-help  plus
plaintiff filing  fees is  worse  than  what the  state  was not  permitted  to
do  to  the  Boddie  petitioners?  Is  the  interest  in  marrying  more
important  than  that  in  living?  Is  the  state  of  being  (more or  less)
helplessly  exposed  to  boundary-crossings  less  undesirable  than  that  of
being locked into a bad marriage?
2.  Constitutional  and Other Rights
Defenders  of the Boddie line might respond that  the  associational
interests  tied up with marriage  and divorce  must be deemed  more  de-
serving of protection  than  the generality  of interests  tied  up  with liv-
ing  (no matter how implausible  that ranking may  seem to some),  be-
cause  the former  interests  occupy  a  special status  in the  constitutional
document which is the Court's basic charter.
As long as the  assumed  access  rights of civil  defendants  generally
are kept in view,  the constitutional-interest  factor cannot  alone  explain
emergent  doctrine.  Like technical monopoly, the constitutional-interest
factor  may  succeed  in  differentiating  divorce  plaintiffs  from  plaintiffs
in general,  but it cannot  distinguish defendants  in general  from plain-
tiffs  in general. 1 59  Reliance  on  the  constitutional-interest  factor  thus
158.  The  useful  metaphor  of  the  boundary  is  part  of  my  debt  to  another  writer.
See R. NozicK, supra  note 91.
159.  Of  course,  we  can  imagine  a  case in  which,  say, the  defendant  is  confronted
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implies  some  sort  of  functional  equivalence  (for  purposes  of  saying
when  persons  may  not  be  denied  access  to  court)  between  having
such  an interest at stake  (if you want to be  a plaintiff)  and facing  the
threat  of  a  legally  final  determination  (i.e.,  being  a  defendant)  if
you  have  no  such  interest  at  stake.  The  implication  of  emergent
doctrine  is  that  lack  of  practical, extrajudicial  escape  routes  from  a
threat  of  legally final  determination is  the  functional  equivalent  of
technical lack  of  extrajudicial  means  of vindicating  a constitutionally
favored interest.  I  submit  (incorporating  by  reference  all prior  dis-
cussion  of  the  monopoly  factor)1 60  that  there  is  no  possible  way  to
establish  such  a peculiar-seeming  equivalence  except  simply  to  run  it
up the flagpole.
At  any  rate,  the  persuasiveness  of  the  proffered  equivalence
must  depend heavily  on  the  validity  of  the  constitutional-interest  fac-
tor itself, in isolation from the monopoly or finality-threat factor, as a dis-
criminant  for  court-access  problems.  In  order  to  isolate  the  consti-
tutional-interest  factor  for  close  examination,  I  want  to  assume
arguendo a  doctrine  under which all  plaintiffs  suing to vindicate  such
interests,161  and  only  such  plaintiffs,  enjoy  constitutional  protection
against exclusion by court fees.
Now  the  view  implicit in the assumed  doctrine  seems  to  be that
if a legal claim can be hooked up in the required way 6'  with  a consti-
tutional  text  bestowing  some  sort  of  personal  right  (or  otherwise
granting  special  recognition  to  some  personal  interest),  we  ought  to
with  an injunction  against his  speaking  freely;  but  the  Court's  intended  protection  for
defendants  plainly  is  not limited  to  such  cases.  One  could  also  note  that a  money
judgment  will  cut down  the defendant's  ability to  exercise  his preferred  freedoms;  but,
then,  so  will  a plaintiff's  inability  to  recover  such  a  judgment.  To  suggest  that  de-
fendants  but not plaintiffs  have a  constitutional  due process right  not to  be  denied  a
hearing will  not help,  since  that is just  the proposition I  am  challenging.  In  order  to
cut any ice,  the interest which  enjoys preferred  constitutional status  must be  one  which
the hearing would help protect; it .cannot itself be the interest in being heard.
160.  See text accompanying  notes 100-15 supra.
161.  I  make  this  assumption  irrespective  of what  relief  is  sought  or of  whether  it
is technically available  through extrajudicial channels.
162.  The  reason  for  the  circumlocution  is  that  it  is  unclear  just  what  form  of
verbal  connection  between  the plaintiff's  claimed  interest  (or his  cause  of action)  and
the  constitutional  text  is required  in  order  to  activate  the  Boddie-Kras-Ortwein prefer-
ence  for constitutional rights.  On the one hand, we have  to assume  that such activation
does not result  simply  from  the  plaintiff's  assertion  of  an  interest  in  "life,  liberty,  or
property"  protected  (in  certain  ways)  by  the  fifth  and  fourteenth  amendments'  due
process  clauses  (and  consider,  also,  the  fourth  amendment),  else  virtually  all
civil  plaintiffs  would  enjoy  preferred  status.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Constitution's
failure  to mention  an  interest  explicitly  does  not ipso  facto  exclude  it  from  the pre-
ferred  circle.  Consider, for example,  the interest  in "freedom  of  association"  involved
in Boddie.
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be more  anxious  to  allow for vindication  of that claim  than  to  assure
vindication  of  the  residue  of  run-of-the-mine  claims  based  on  com-
mon  law  and  statute.  In  the  effectuation  perspective,  the  implicit
view would be that legal vindication  of constitutionally  affiliated  inter-
ests  is  more important  to the  individuals  holding  those  interests  than
is  true of  other  interests  protected  by  nonconstitutional  law.  A  fur-
ther  possibility,  of course,  is  suggested  by  the  deterrence  perspective:
whether  or  not  "constitutional"  interests  are  more  important  to  their
holders  than other legally  protected interests,  their  vindication  is more
important from  the  standpoint  of a  society  relying  on  privately  insti-
gated  litigation  as  a process  for  curbing  socially  undesirable  types  of
behavior.  A  priori there  seems  to  be  no  basis  for  supposing  that
importance  from the  deterrence  standpoint is perfectly  congruent  with
importance  from the  effectuation  standpoint.  Accordingly,  in  the  dis-
cussion  which  follows,  I  shall  mean  by  "importance"  of  an  interest
the relative urgency  or priority from either  standpoint (whichever may
be preferred  by the  reader  wishing  to  attack my  argument)  of litiga-
tion seeking to vindicate that interest.
As  examples  of  constitutional  interests,  we  can  use  freedom
of speech  and the  freedom  of  association  involved  in Boddie.' 0 3  For
present  purposes  we  can  speak  of interests  in freedom  of speech  and
association  without saying precisely  what  categories  of possible  activity
would be thought to implicate  these interests  to a significant or critical
degree.  We need  assume  only  that  there  are  discoverable  sets  of such
categories, 64  such  that interference  with  one's liberty  or ability  to  en-
gage in any  of the  activities  those categories  contain  is thought  to vio-
late' 1 5  freedom of  speech or  association.  We shall  call  these  activities
"constitutionally protected."
Examples  of interests  protected  by  law but not,  as  such,  by  the
Constitution,'60  are the  interests  in physical  security of person or pos-
sessions,  in one's  deservedly  good reputation,  in not being  defrauded,
163.  Readers  might  find  it  illuminating  also  to  bear  in  mind  the  constitutional
interest  involved  in my  story  (see  text  accompanying  notes  4-15  supra):  that  is,  the
interest  in  not  being  deprived  of  one's  possessions  by  the  state  without  having  been
afforded  a  hearing.  For present  purposes  it  does  not  matter  that  association  is  not
mentioned  eo nomine  in  the  Constitution.  For  simplicity,  we  can  imagine  that  it  is.
164.  However,  these  categories  may  not be  discoverable  except  by a casuistic  proc-
ess of case-by-case  examination.
165.  For the  sake of  textual simplicity, I  shall use  "violate,"  in regard to  a constitu-
tionally protected  interest,  to describe  actions which  are either held  to be prohibited  or
held to require extraordinary justification  (e.g., a "compelling state interest").
166.  The reader must remember that "life,  liberty,  and property"  simpliciter do  not
count as constitutional interests.  See note 162 supra.
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in not having one's living space made unhealthful.'1 7
However  superficially  appealing  the  inference  that  constitution-
ally recognized  interests  are more  important  than other  legally  recog-
nized interests,  that inference  cannot validly be drawn  unless it notice-
ably harmonizes with what we know or can plausibly believe about why
some interests are mentioned in, or read into, the Constitution  and why
some  are not.  Is it the case that  associational  freedom was mentioned
(as  it were)  and personal security was not because the Framers thought,
or the courts  think, that the former interest is more important  than the
latter?  Do we think that?  Is it not a most implausible  view?168   But
then what can  account for the  Constitution's  selective  enshrinement  of
interests?
One  must -begin by  noting  that  the  Constitution,  insofar  as  we
view it as designed to  protect interests, 69 is  specifically  concerned with
preventing  their  violation  by government  and  its  agents.  The Consti-
tution  does  not purport  to  regulate private  conduct.  Out of that  cir-
cumstance  arises a basic  ambiguity  as to what is meant by my assumed
doctrine  that an  indigent  plaintiff  is  constitutionally  entitled  to relief
from  access  fees  if, but  only if,  he  is  seeking  to  vindicate  a  constitu-
tional interest.  For a person's interest in, say,  freedom  of  association
is obviously  susceptible  of violation by both private  and  governmental
conduct, although private violation  is not covered by the constitutional
prohibition.  In  the  case  of  private  violation,  are  we  to  say  that  a
constitutional interest is  involved  so  that exclusionary  access  fees may
not  be  imposed?  If  the  answer  is  "no,"  we  shall  have  to  explain
why  preventing  or  requiting  violations  of,  say,  the  associational  in-
terest is  more important  when those violations  are  committed by  gov-
ernmental  than  by  private  agents.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  answer
is  "yes,"  we  shall have to display  and  test the reasoning  that connects
the  premise  (that certain  interests  have  been  accorded  special  protec-
tion  against  governmental  encroachment)  with  the  conclusion  (that
it is more important to litigate  against private violations  of those inter-
ests  than  private  violations  of  other interests).  If  neither  of  those
167.  It is a natural temptation  to include the interest in having  your promises kept.
But it  not quite  clear  why  that interest  is not  a constitutionally  protected  one.  Com-
pare U.S.  CONST.  art. I,  § 10  with id. amend.  I.  See also Ely,  The  Wages of  Crying
Wolf:  A  Comment on Roe  v. Wade,  82  YALE  L..  920,  939  & n.107  (1973);  Tribe,
Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law,  87  HAv. L.
REv.  1, 12  (1973).  On the other hand, it seems too  much to accept that the "contract"
interest is more important than the personal-security interest.
168.  How  can  the  associational  interest  be  realized  if the  security  interest  is  not?
169.  For a  different,  though  related  perspective  on the  "substantive"  provisions  of
the Constitution, see Tribe, supra note 167.
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tasks  can  be  satisfyingly  done,  the  only  conclusion  left  will  be  that
constitutional  enshrinement  of an  interest is not  a measure  of the  im-
portance of litigation  seeking to  vindicate it;  and then the task will be
to  explain,  in  some  way  which  harmonizes  with  that  conclusion,  the
phenomenon of selective constitutional protection.
Let us now  consider the application of constitutional  limitations to
government  in  contexts  not  directly  involving  its  distinguishing  mon-
opoly  over  lawful  force  and  legislative  authority-where  government
acts  as  an  owner, rather  than purely  as  a sovereign,  in controlling  ac-
cess  to  and  enjoyment  of  benefits  such  as  employment,  largess,  or
public  facilities. °   Public  facilities  are  the  most interesting  case  for
our purposes  because  they pose  the clearest  comparison  between  gov-
ernmental and private interference  with protected  activities.  The Con-
stitution  prohibits1 71  government  from  squelching  speech  on its  land,
but  private  landowners  are  generally  free  to  squelch. " 2   Does  this
differential  treatment  signify a judgment  that governmental  squelching
is  "worse"  than  private  squelching-or  that  vindication  of  the  in-
terest  in  freedom  from  governmental  censorship  is  more  important
than in the case of private  censorship?  If pressed  to explain  or justify
such  a judgment  one  might refer  to special  symbolic  or  anti-educative
elements  in  governmental  censorship,  or  to  the  special  likelihood  that
government  will  control  an  unusually  large  portion  of  the  places
where  people  will  want  to  speak  out.  But  these  explanations  have
weaknesses, 173  and their  significance  may pale  in  the light  cast by an-
other:  that governmental  censorship  can  be  proscribed  with  compara-
170.  I do  not mean  that a discriminatory  or censorious type of public-property  man-
agement  may  not  originate in  statute; but  such a  statute  would  not  be  an  exercise  of
"legislative"  power  within  the  classification  which  is  convenient  for  my  present  pur-
poses,  because  we  can  as  plausibly  see  the  government  in  such  cases  acting  in  the
capacity of owner as in that of lawgiver.
Government  also  controls  access  to  activities  having no  private-sector  analogues-
the  vote,  for  example.  This  suggests  another  reason,  not  discussed  in  the  text,  why
certain  constitutional  mandates  are  addressed  to  government  agents  only:  such  man-
dates  would  be  irrelevant  if  addressed  to  anyone  else.  Guaranties  concerning  the
franchise  and  the  litigation  process  (e.g.,  jury  trial,  confrontation,  right  to  counsel)
are  the  obvious  examples.  But  cf.,  e.g.,  Terry  v.  Adams,  345  U.S.  461  (1953);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91  (1945).
171.  I  use this  term to encompass  also the notion  of  demanding  a special  justifica-
tion (compelling state interest).  See note 165 supra.
172.  See  Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551  (1972).
173.  Symbolism:  Why  is  governmental  tolerance  of  squelching  by  major  land-
owners  less  deplorably  symbolic  than  squelching  by  the  government  itself?  Compare
Reitman  v.  Mulkey,  387  U.S.  369  (1967).  Government as  major landowner  Is  it
likely that  the historical  framers  wished or  contemplated  that  this  development  would
come about?  Is this condition  ndemi,  in the constitutional  scheme?
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tive  abandon  because  when  it  occurs  there  are  no  competing  values
of privacy,  territoriality,  or individual  autonomy  to weigh  in  the bal-
ance.17 4  Framers  envisioning  an  individualist,  open  society,  served
by both an economic  market and  a lively marketplace  of ideas,  would
want to rule out state  censorship but would  have to shrink  from ban-
ning  censorship  by  private  owners.  These  framers  would  probably
leave  to  the  legislature  the  task  of  striking  the  appropriate  balance
from time to time between the needs or values  of speech  and those  of
privacy  and ownership.175   But  persons  in their roles  as  governmental
agents  neither  enjoy nor represent  that  complex  of values  traditionally
ascribed  to  institutions  of  private  ownership;  and  given  a  modicum
of special reason  to mistrust their  commitment  (and  that of the  legis-
lature)  to free  speech  values, 7" framers  could  well  prefer  a  limited
sacrifice  of future legislative  flexibility  in return  for  enlistment  of the
judiciary in the resistance to state censorship.
Enough  has been said, I believe,  to  show how shaky must be any
inference  that litigating in opposition  to  censorship  is more  important
when the state is  the censor  than when it is not.  Indeed,  the opposite
inference is at least as  plausible.  The question  of litigating in opposi-
tion  to  private  censorship  can  arise  only  when  the  rules  of  statutory
and common  law  are  such that one  can  successfully  plead a cause  of
action  against a private owner,  with the claim  stemming from the lat-
ter's  acts  of  censorship  on  his  own  turf.  And  when  that  is  so,  it
seems  that the lawmakers  and law-declarers-legislatures  and  courts-
have  placed  an  unusually high value  on the individual  or social inter-
est in the expressive  activity.  They have concluded  that that activity,
under  the  circumstances  surrounding  it, has  sufficient  importance  to
overcome  the  competing  values  associated  with  privacy  and  owner-
ship-the very  values  whose  ubiquitous  importance  may  explain  why
the  Framers  withheld  constitutional  prohibitions  against  private  inter-
ference with speech.
I  conclude  that,  in  the case  of the  free  speech  interest,  there  is
174.  Cf.  Burke  & Reber,  State Action,  Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights:
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S.  CAL. L. Rtv.  1003,  1011,  1016-18,  1045
(1973).
175.  See,  e.g.,  NLRB  v. Babcock  & Wilcox  Co.,  351  U.S.  105  (1956)  (construing
National  Labor  Relations  Act  § 8(a)(1),  29  U.S.C.  §  158(a)(1)  (1970)  );  Ch.  93,
[1973]  Minn.  Laws.  In Lenrich  Associates v. Heyda,  504  P.2d  112  (Ore.  1972),  the
court read  Lloyd  Corp.  v.  Tanner,  407 U.S.  551  (1972),  as  holding  that  the  private-
property  interests  were constitutionally  preferred  to the speech  interests,  so  that a state
law  requiring owners  to make  allowance  for speakers  would  be invalid.  For  effective
criticism of this amazing decision, see 86 HA-Iv. L. Rav. 1592  (1973).
176.  See  text accompanying notes 183-84  infra.
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nothing  like  a  firm  basis  for  inferring  that  litigation  is  more  impor-
tant  when  directed  against  governmental  than  against  private  viola-
tions.  If no such basis  exists  in the case  of speech, it seems  most un-
likely  that  any  will  be  discovered  for  many-if  any-of  the  other
constitutional  interests.  The  relevance  to  the  access-fee  problem  of
constitutional  enshrinement  of  the  interest  at  stake must,  then,  be  as
great when the  alleged violator is  a private citizen  as when he is a state
agent.  But  thus  broadly  construed,  perhaps  the  relevance  of  selec-
tive enshrinement  is, at least, plausible.  For what can  the principle  of
selection be,  if not judgments  of relative  importance  of the  protected
activities?  If relative  importance  is what  determines  the  selection  of
interests for  special  protection  against  governmental violation,  does  it
not make  sense  to think  that a parallel  ranking  of interests  implicitly
holds  when  violators  are private-even  though  their violations  are not
constitutionally proscribed?
To  see  what  is  wrong  with  such  reasoning,  we  should  now
consider  the  application  of  constitutional  limitations  to  government
in  its  "sovereign"  capacity  of  law-giver  and  monopolist  of  lawful
force.  Government  is  distinguished  by  its  exclusive  control  of  the
power to say  whether  a given  course  of conduct  will  or will not give
rise  to  liability  to  some  form  of  coercive  redress;  and  this  distin-
guishing  power  of  the  government  to  make  the  law  seemingly  must
be  a major  factor  in  explaining  why  certain  prohibitions  are  written
so  as  to  apply  specially  to  government  (a truth  made manifest  by the
very  language  of  some  familiar  constitutional  prohibitions),.m
Consider  again  a person's  interest in  freedom  of  speech  or  asso-
ciation,  and  compare  the  private  and  governmental  sectors  with  re-
gard to their respective  abilities to violate the interest.  Absent consti-
tutional  limitations,  government  can  fashion  the law  so  that  a  person
will  be punished  for  engaging  in protected  activities,  or  so that  others
will  be  punished  if  they  so  conduct  themselves  as  to  facilitate  or
accommodate  engagement  in  protected  activities,  or  so  that  govern-
mental agents  will be immunized  from legal liability in case they  inter-
fere directly  with  one's  engagement  in protected  activities  or with  the
facilitating  or  accommodating  actions  of others.  On  the  other  hand,
a private  agent (except insofar  as he acts in an  ownership capacity)  al-
most  certainly  cannot  undertake  to  produce  comparable  results  with-
out committing  a tort.  Nontortious  violation  of one's interest in free-
dom of association  will not normally  occur except  through an  exercise
of lawmaking power that belongs exclusively to government.
177.  See  note 167 supra.
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Now  let  us  attempt  a  parallel  discussion  concentrating  on  the
interest in personal security.  It is no less  true of this interest than of
association  that  government  can  exercise  its  lawmaking  power  in  a
manner  antithetical  to  protection  of  the  interest.  A  law  might  ex-
cuse from normal  tort-law  sanctions  certain categories  of private  con-
duct  that  appear  to  violate  or  threaten  the  personal-security  interest
(for example,  a statute  authorizing  the  location  of noxious  or  danger-
ous  activities  at places  where  they  might  be  actionable  nuisances  at
common  law);178  or  a  law  might  authorize  punishment  of  one  who
tries to  protect himself  physically  against  such private conduct  (for ex-
ample,  a gun-control  law-not clearly  considered,  in spite  of the  sec-
ond  amendment,  to warrant  "strict"  judicial  review). 1 79  For purposes
of the present discussion, we must assume that such laws  are valid de-
spite  any  challenges  which  might  be launched  under  the  due process
or  equal  protection  clauses-that  the  Constitution  does prohibit  laws
hostile to  the associational  interest, but  does not prohibit  laws  hostile
to the  security interest. s0  Does  not such  a  comparison  indicate  that
the  former  interest is  deemed more  important  than  the  latter?  What
else  can  possibly  explain  the  Constitution's  selection  of  which  in-
terests  to protect  against  hostile  exercises  of  legislative  power?  Any
disagreement  we  might  have  with  the  Framers'  implicit  ranking  (for
example,  their preferring  freedom  of  association  to  security  of  person
and possessions)  could not refute  this  account  if it is  the  only plausi-
ble  one.  But  such  disagreement  can  and  should  not  only  prompt  a
search for  an alternative  account which  does not entail  such  implausi-
ble  rankings  of  interests  by  supposed  importance,  but  also  make  us
receptive to any such alternative we may discover.
Now  there is available  a perfectly plausible-indeed,  a rather  per-
suasive-account  of  selective  constitutional  protection  for  interests.
Relying  not  at  all  on  implausible  suppositions  about  the  interests'
relative, intrinsic  importance,  this  account rests  on the ideas  that judi-
cially  enforced rules limiting legislative  power are generally  undesirable
and that it is generally best to allow the legislature to pass laws without
restriction,  apart  from its  members'  own  morality, prudence,  and  po-
litical  ambition.  Judicial control might be  disfavored both for reasons
178.  See,  e.g.,  Linsler  v.  Booth  Undertaking  Co.,  120  Wash.  177,  206  P.  976
(1922)  (compliance  with zoning  ordinance negates nuisance liability).
179.  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.  174  (1939).
180.  Environmental  litigation  is  now  generating  holdings  that  preservation  of  a
healthy  environment  is not  a  constitutional  right.  E.g.,  Hagedorn  v.  Union  Carbide
Corp.,  5  E.R.C.  1755  (N.D.W.  Va.,  Aug.  24,  1973);  Tanner  v.  Armco  Steel  Corp.,
340 F. Supp.  532  (S.D.  Tex.  1972); see Ely v. Velde,  451  F.2d  1130  (4th Cir.  1971).
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of  democratic  principle"8'  and  because  prohibitory  rules  suitable
for  judicial  enforcement  will  tend  towards  a  degree  of  generality
and inflexibility that on  at least some occasions  will rule out legislative
actions  both  expedient  and  just.8 2   Given  this  general  attitude,
framers'8s  might nevertheless  be  led by speculation  or historical  expe-
rience  to  believe  that  there  are  some  exceptional  categories  of inter-
ests  as  to which  neither the moral  and prudential  sensitivities  of  legis-
lators  nor  the  political  check  will  function  adequately  as  a  deterrent
against inexpedient or unjust laws.
To  see  how.  such  interests  might  be  selected,  we  can  imagine
scales measuring  four different  traits.  A selected  interest is one  which
scores relatively high on at least one of the first two scales and on both
of the second  two.  The traits  measured  by the  scales  are:  (1)  likeli-
hood  that  incumbent  office-holders  (including  legislators)  will,  per-
haps by virtue  of their very incumbency,  be subject to  special  tempta-
tions  or  motivations  to  violate  the  interest;  (2)  likelihood  that  large
portions  of the electorate  will,  on occasions  of stress,  be  short-sighted
or tunnel-visioned  in estimating the importance  of the interest  to them-
selves;  (3) unlikelihood  that full  enjoyment  of the interest free  of state
interference  will  infringe  on  the  legitimate  interests  of  others;  and
(4) likelihood that courts  can provide  worthwhile protection  for the  in-
terest  without  violating  the  framers'  conception  of  a  proper  judicial
role.
High  scores  on  scales  (3) and  (4)  will  rarely,  if  ever,  be  suffi-
cient  in  themselves  to justify  constitutional  protection  for  an  interest;
rather their occurrence  in conjunction with high scores  on one  or both
of  the  other  scales  will  confirm  the  case  for  protection  which  those
other traits tend to make.'8  Traits  (1) and (2)  can be grouped together
181.  See Michelman  995-96.
182.  See  Heymann, supra note 121,  at 840-41.
183.  Here  and  in the  next  few  paragraphs,  the  word  "framers"  should  be  read  to
include judges  engaged  in  constitutional  interpretation,  to just that  degree to which  the
reader  wishes  to  regard  the  courts  as  properly  or  actually  engaged  in  "creative"  in-
terpretation.
184.  It is easy to  see  how the first  amendment  interests  in expressive,  political,  and
religious  liberties might fit the  account suggested in  the text.  The  same  goes for  safe-
guards  concerning  criminal  prosecutions  and  related  governmental  activities  found  in
the fourth,  fifth, sixth,  and eighth  amendments  and likewise  for  the  safeguards  against
governmental  seizures  of  property  found  in  the  third  and  fifth.  (The  partially
related  proscription  of  the  contract  clause  seems  to  owe  a  lot  to  specific  historical
context.)  The  safeguards  against  state  chauvinism  found  in  the  privileges  and  im-
munities  clauses,  the  commerce  clause,  and  the  interstate  travel  right  (whatever  its
textual  base  is  supposed  to be)  also  fit the suggested  account.  Heymann  & Barzelay,
The Forest and the  Trees, Roe  v. Wade and Its Critics, 53  B.U.L.  REV.  765  (1963),  is
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as  indicators  of  an  interest's  political  "weakness."  When  an  interest
is  politically  weak,  there  exists  an  unusually  high  risk  that normally
reliable  forces-legislative  conscience,  prudence,  and  responsive-
ness  to constituent pressure-will  fail to check laws  which in a longer
or broader view will be found inexpedient or unjust.  As to such inter-
ests,  but only  as  to them,  framers  might  be willing  to establish  judi-
cially  enforceable  restraints  on  legislative  action  ("substantive  consti-
tutional  rights"),  even  though  these  limitations  carry  their  own  dis-
tinct risks of inflexibility and prudential obtuseness which will likely re-
sult on some  occasions  in preventing  the legislature  from  passing laws
which  are,  in  truth,  both  expedient  and  just.  Of  course,  as  to  any
interest  that  is  politically  "strong"-any  interest  about  which  the
framers  would  feel  confident  that a  democratically  controlled  legisla-
ture would not wish or dare to pass laws that violate such interest with-
out  urgent  or  politically  persuasive  reasons-framers  would  be more
likely to prefer the risk of an occasional  legislative excess to the risk of
overbroad judicial repression.
Insofar  as  the  foregoing  is found  to  be a  persuasive  account  of
constitutional  limitations  (it  need  not  be  found  the only  persuasive
explanation-simply  a  good,  competitive  account),  the  automatic  at-
tribution  to  constitutional  interests  of  exceptional  power  to  override
exclusionary  court  access  fees  seems  hard  to  defend.  For  in  terms
of my suggested  account, such an attribution must depend on reasoning
that, when  made  explicit,  appears  two-pronged.  If  an interest  is  not
so  widely  and  strongly  cherished  that  the  political  process  can  be
relied  upon  to  check  excessive  legislative  enroachment  upon  that in-
terest,  so  that  protection  in  the  form  of  a  substantive  constitutional
right is  deemed  necessary  despite its  heavy systemic  costs,  it is peculi-
arly important that litigation  aimed  at effectuating  that interest not be
frustrated  by  access  fees.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  an  interest  does
have such  political strength that it can normally  expect  adequate  legal
largely an  argument  that interests  grouped  under  the heading  of  family privacy  (mar-
riage,  procreation,  child-rearing)  fit the  account  rather  well.  On  the  other hand,  the
reluctance  to constitutionalize  any  interest  in being  maintained  at a minimum  level  of
welfare  might  reflect  a  low  score  on  scale  (4),  undermining  possible  high  scores  on
scales  (1)  and  (2).  See Michelman  997-98,  1001-03,  1005-10.
The  interest  in  not  suffering  discrimination  on  account  of  race  of  course  scores
very  high on  the  composite  scale.  In  fact,  whenever  the  legislature  employs  express
classifications,  there is the  suggestion of  a divide-and-conquer  tactic  (or  effect),  imply-
ing  significant  scores  on  scales  (1)  and  (2)  and  relating  equal  protection  to  the  sug-
gested  framework.  Of  course,  the  doctrine  of  strict  review  for  "suspect  classifica-
tions,"  or in  defense  of  "discrete  and  insular  minorities,"  harmonizes  nicely  with  this
account of equal protection.
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protection  at  the  legislative  and  common  law  levels  without  constitu-
tional compulsion,  frustration by  access fees  of litigation  in its support
is a problem of lesser moment.
How  can such reasoning  be  defended?  The most obvious  objec-
tion to it is  that an  interest's  enjoyment  of political  strength implies  a
stable,  popular  view  of it as intrinsically  important.  One  might want
to  argue  that  if  legislative  (or  other  governmental)  action  of  a  cer-
tain  sort  is  forbidden  because  the  interests  thereby  threatened  are
thought  too  politically  weak  to  assure  adequate  counteraction  to
feared  legislative  temptation  and  a  substantive  constitutional  right
is  therefore  (despite  its systemic  costs)  erected  to protect  that interest,
then  obviously  judicial  counteraction  is  desired  and  anything  (such  as
an exclusionary  access  fee) that  gets  in  the  way  must be  disfavored.
This  looks,  indeed,  like  a  very  strong  argument  for  invalidating  ac-
cess fees when  applied in such  cases with  exclusionary  effect.  And  so
it is.  What  it is  not,  however,  is  an  argument  for  treating  indigent
plaintiffs  in these  cases  with  any  greater solicitude  than  we  would  af-
ford  to  indigent  plaintiffs  seeking  vindication  of  a broad  spectrum  of
interests  protected  by nonconstitutional  law.  With  constitutional  limi-
tations,  we  resort to  law  (judicial review)  because  of an  apprehension
that legislative  restraint,  or  the  popular  will  or  popular  morality  in-
spiring it, cannot  adequately  be  trusted  to  prevent  inexpedient  or  un-
just governmental action.  But civil liability rules can quite analogously
be  seen  as  a  systemically  costly  resort  to  law  because  nonlegal  re-
straint  (whether  moral  or  prudential  self-restraint  by  individuals  or
nonlegal  external  restraint  by  the  community)  cannot  adequately  be
trusted  to  prevent  inexpedient  or  unjust  private  action.188  Limita-
tions  are  found  in  the  Constitution  insofar  as  legislative  (or  other
governmental)  "boundary  crossings"  are  feared;  they  are found  in pri-
vate  law  insofar  as  private  boundary  crossings  are  feared.  There
simply is no  basis  for  saying that intrinsically  more important  bound-
aries  are  guarded  by  constitutional  limitations  than  by  nonconstitu-
tional  law.  All  we  can  say  with  confidence  is  that  the  boundaries
guarded  by  the  Constitution  are  thought  to  be  inadequately  guarded
by nonconstitutional law and nonlegal restraint.
186
185.  Cf. J. RAwLS, supra note  80,  at 240-41.  The systemic  costs of using legal  rules
to  constrain  behavior  encompass  costs  of  inflexibility  analogous  to  those  previously
mentioned  (see  text  accompanying  notes  181-83  supra),  including  the  cost  of  "un-
necessary"  restrictions  on  liberty-restrictions  entailed  by  the  rules  but  which  par-
ticularistic,  situational  judgments  would have  opposed.  Cf.  Kennedy,  Legal Formality,
2 J. LEGAL  STUDIEs  351,  359  (1973).  Another cost is that  of enforcement  (e.g.,  litiga-
tion  costs  including  the  time-loss  and  annoyance  sustained  by  the  participants).
186.  Compare Tribe, supra note  167, at 46 n.213.
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Is it possible  that I  have  misconstrued  the  Court's  attribution  of
significance  to an  interest's having been  accorded  special  status in the
Constitution?  Constitutional status, it might be said,  is not treated by
the  Court  as  a touchstone  of an  interest's  importance  in  any  intrinsic
sense,  but rather  as  determining  a question  of  allocation  of protective
responsibility  between  the  legislative  and judicial  branches  of govern-
ment.
187   It is the legislature's  job, to be carried on free  of judicial in-
terference,18 5  to  decide  what kind,  scope,  and  degree  of  legal  protec-
tion are appropriate for each of the residue of unmentioned interests-
and this  includes,  of course, decision  about when,  if ever, it is best not
to grant any protection at all.  But when it comes to the specially men-
tioned interests,  the judiciary  has been  given a much more substantial
role  in  such  decisions.  Accordingly,  when the  Supreme  Court  holds
that  a plaintiff may not be prevented by  exclusionary  access  fees  from
pursuing  such  legal protections  as  are  generally  available  for his  con-
stitutionally  "mentioned"  interests  such  as  freedom  of  association,
while  at  the  same  time  indicating  that  such  exclusion  is  permissible
with regard to  the unmentioned interest in personal security, the Court
is  not  to  be  understood  as  saying  that  the  mentioned  interest  is
intrinsically  more important  than the  unmentioned  one.  Instead, the
Court  indicates  only  that  the  Framers  were  prepared  to  accept  the
risk  that  the  legislatures  would  permit  exclusion  in  the  case  of  un-
mentioned  interests,  but  rejected  such  a  risk  as  regards  the  men-
tioned  ones-perhaps  making  this  differentiation  for the very  sorts  of
reasons  I  have  suggested  above. 89  That is,  the Framers  might have
believed  that in the case  of politically  strong interests,  the legislatures
would not allow for  such exclusion without  having strong and  obvious
(politically  effective)  reasons  for doing  so,  whereas  no  such  assurance
existed in regard to politically weak interests.
There  are  two  grounds  for  rejecting  this  interpretation  of  the
Court's reliance  on the  constitutional  factor  in Boddie, Kras, and Ort-
wein-one of  them  conclusive,  the other  merely  persuasive.
The  conclusive  ground  is  that  the  suggested  reading  does  not
square with the Court's clear message that due process  prevents the ex-
clusion  of  any  defendant  by  an  access  fee.  Since  what  a  defendant
normally has  at stake is liberty or property simpliciter, and not one of
187.  And  also,  in  the  case  of  United  States  Supreme  Court  review,  constitutional
status  may  determine  a  like  question  of  allocation  between  the  national  and  state
governments.  My  discussion  at  this point  owes  much  to  another  commentator.  See
Tribe, supra note 167.
188.  Except,  perhaps,  where  the  legislature  acts  "irrationally,"  or  discriminates
"invidiously."
189.  See text  accompanying  notes  181-86  supra.
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the  "preferred  freedoms,"'-90  there  seems  no  escape  from  the  conclu-
sion that the  Court is reading the due process  clause sometimes  to pro-
hibit  legislatures  from  denying  a  hearing  (or  allowing  exclusion  by
fees)  when  legally  protected,  but  constitutionally  unmentioned,  inter-
ests are in jeopardy.
The  merely  persuasive  ground  is that  an  exclusionary  access  fee
will  rarely,  if ever,  arise  out  of  a legislature's  having  behaved  in the
way that  most  clearly  calls  for  strict  judicial  review  under  the  weak-
interest/strong-interest  theory  of  constitutional  allocation  of  protec-
tive roles.  The  access  fees are normally  fixed  all  at once  for a  broad
spectrum  of  civil  actions.  (This  was  true  of  the fees  in  the  Boddie
case.)  Though  these  turn  out to  include  some  actions  which  would
be  brought  in order  to prevent  or  requite  violations  of  constitutional
interests, no  one thinks  that the legislature  focused on that  prospect  in
enacting  or authorizing  the  access  fees.  The  legislature has not given
short  shrift  to politically  weak  interests;  rather,  paying  weak  interests
no  focused  attention  at  all, it  has  given somewhat  short  shrift  to  the
whole  battery  of  supposedly  strong interests.  Thus  the  clearest  rea-
son  for  giving  weak  interests  special  status  in the  Constitution  is  not
implicated  where  exclusion  results  from  blanket  civil-action  access
fees.  The  only  ground the  Court  could  have for  selectively  granting
relief  from  such  de  facto  exclusionary  effects,  using  constitutional
status  as the basis  of selection,  would be its supposition  that  constitu-
tional interests are peculiarly important.
3.  Interests  Ranked by Importance
If I am  correct  in  suggesting  that  constitutional  enshrinement  is
not  an  apt  criterion  of  an  interest's  importance  for  litigation-access
purposes,  no  insuperable  problem  is  thereby  posed  for  a  Supreme
Court  staking out  constitutional protection  for  court  access  rights.  It
is not  as if the  Court must have  a principle  at hand  for differentiating
among the  interests  clamoring for protection  in the form  of  a judicial
hearing  (with  constitutional  "mention"  furnishing  the  only  imaginable
principle);  for  there  is  no  apparent  reason  why  the  Court  could  not
extend  such  protection  to  every  interest  recognized  by  state  law
through  such  law's  definition  of valid  legal  claims  and  defenses.
But I do not mean it is  self-evident  that no  satisfactory  differen-
tiating principle  can  be  found  (although  constitutional  mention is  not
a  satisfactory  one).  Offhand it  does  not  seem  unreasonable  to  sug-
gest  that not all  legally  recognized  claims  are  integral parts  of the in-
190.  See  note 159  supra.
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terest in  "living,"  even  though  some  obviously  are.  Thus,  using  as  a
benchmark the pristine  cases  of assault and trespass most clearly analo-
gous  to  the  impact  on  a  defendant, of  an  unmerited  adverse  judg-
ment,  the  Court might  be  able to  distinguish  among legal  claims  ac-
cording  to  how immediate  and direct  an  invasion of the plaintiff's lib-
erty  (or  impairment  of  the  plaintiff's  life)  is  involved.  The  Court
might  feel  that  even  though  it  could  not  satisfyingly  differentiate
the  plaintiff-victim's  position  in  assault  and  trespass  cases  from  that
of  an  erroneously  coerced  defendant,  yet  in numerous  other  contexts
it  could  say  persuasively  that  the victim's  remedial  "right"  was  really
just  a prosecutorial  role in a deterrence  scheme,  a function which  the
state  could  freely  dispense  with  (or  condition  on  payment  of  fees)  if
it so  chose; or else the  Court could  assert that this  "right" was  a mere
administrative  convenience  made  available  by  the state  without  there-
by either  meaning  to  suggest  recognition  of any  right  or  creating  any
reasonable  understanding  that  a  right  was  intended.  Indeed,  some-
one  might gleefully  offer Kras and Ortwein as  excellent  specimens  of
the latter category of cases.
While I cannot  flatly  gainsay  the  feasibility  or  utility  of  such  a
particularistic  approach,  I  would  suggest  that  the  sorting  of  legal
claims  into  those which  do and do not have  a right  at  their core is  a
subtler  and  more slippery  task  than  may  at  first  appear.  Moreover,
the  number  of  claims  which  can  be  convincingly  weeded  out  of  the
"rights"  category  is  too small  to make the  task worth undertaking.
The  preferred  class  of  complaints  cannot  be limited  to  those  al-
leging  common-law  intentional torts, simple negligence,19'  and breaches
of  contractual  and  fiduciary  duties. 92  The  line  of  exclusion  can
be pushed back by gradual steps.  Certainly we should have  to include
claims based  on statutes  overtly meant  to substitute  a statutory  scheme
of  protection  for  a  traditional  and  basic  common-law  form.'  And
this  simple  extension  reveals  a principle  which  in  turn  entails  a  great
deal  more  extension:  it  reminds  us  that  legislation  is  often  (at least
evidently)  concerned  with the  setting  of boundaries-that  our  bound-
191.  It seems  clear  that  negligence  must  be  included,  for  it  consists  of  unjustified
incursions  upon  another's  liberty.  By "simple  negligence"  I  mean  to  restrict  what  is
included  (but not for long, see text accompanying  note  196 infra) to cases in which the
claim of  unjustified injury  rests  in no way on a legal  artifice such  as a prima facie  in-
ference  from a prohibitory statute.
192.  Although  some would  argue  that there  is no right to have your promises  kept,
few  would  argue  that  there  is  no  right  to  be  compensated  when  they  are  broken.
Compare PosNER 55-56,  98.
193.  The  classic  example  is  workmen's  compensation.  See,  e.g.,  New  York  Cent.
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188  (1917).
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aries  are  not  definitively  staked out  by  the  "natural  rights"  elements
of the  common law, but are  a resultant  of complex  interplay  between
those  elements  and  positive  law.  Everyone  who  reflects  on  the
problem  understands  why  this  is  so.  At bottom,  the  reason  is  that
every  boundary  is  a reciprocal  proposition,  protecting  persons  in  one
of  their  possible  functions  (or  roles,  or  postures)  while  restricting
them in another.  Our liberties  are  our shackles.  While the  concepts
of  freedom  and  personal  integrity  are  clear  enough  at  their  cores,
they grow hazy at the edges  of interaction; and a  more-or-less  continu-
ous effort  at definition  is  required in  order that  there  may  be  any  ef-
fective  or  tolerable boundaries  at  all.  In part, this  view  simply indi-
cates  a need  for  traffic  rules-your  boundaries,  not  mine,  have  been
crossed if the two of us have a head-on  collision while I am driving on
the left-hand  side of the  double white  line.  But it is also true that as
societies  evolve  in various  ways-as  their  resources,  technologies,  ac-
tivities,  aspirations,  and  moral  sensitivities  continue  to  change  over
time-realignments  of  boundaries  will  concomitantly  be  required. 1 4
It  is  for  these  reasons,  presumably,  that  even  the  most  committed
natural  rights  theorists  have conceded  a proper role  to legislation-or
have  even  allowed that persons  have a right to  compel  others  to  sub-
mit to a regime of civil society in which legislation is possible.195
We  can  easily see,  then,  that the  preferred  circle  of  claims  must
admit those  of negligence  based  on violation  of a  "protective"  statute
and  also  those  based  directly  on  such  a  statute  without  negligence
as  a  mediating  premise.1 96  At this  point  we  can  see  a  vista  opening
which  has  a limit but no  handy  stopping  point.  Somewhere  between
the  action  complaining  of personal  harm  inflicted  by  emission  of  air
pollutants  in violation  of  statutory  but  not  of  common-law  nuisance
standards,  and  the  action  complaining  of  failure  to  file  an  environ-
mental  impact  statement,  "rights"  may  drop  out;  but it  is  extremely
difficult  to  say  just  where-and  wherever  the  line  is  drawn  (if,  in-
deed,  it  is possible  to  draw  a  line rather  than merely  resorting  to an
ad hoc method of including and excluding),  it is going to seem  arbitrary.
Moreover,  it  is  not  only  claims  having  an  obvious  kinship  with
common-law  claims  in which  rights may be detected.  It may  be  that
some  basic  social  arrangements,  such  as  private  ownership  and  eco-
nomic  markets,  are  maintained,  in part with the  help  of law,  because
these  systems  are  thought  to  be the  best  way  of  assuring  maximum
194.  Fine-tuning the  system by  boundary-drawing  is  part  of  the  courts'  mission  as
well.  See note  122 supra.
195.  E.g., I. KAr,  supra note 88,  at 64-67,  71-72, 75-77,  81.
196.  See text accompanying notes  132-38 supra.
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fulfillment  of  everyone's  rightful  interests-but  only  on  the  under-
standing  that  they  are  to  be  complemented  by  certain  subsidiary  ar-
rangements,  also  involving  legal  claims,  designed  to  avoid  violations
of the  rightful  interests  of some  that  would  otherwise  result  from the
main  arrangements.  It  requires  no  very  heroic  reach  of  imagina-
tion  to  see the  claims  excluded  from court  by  the Kras and Ortwein
decisions  as  arising  under  subsidiary  arrangements  designed  to  pro-
tect rights  which  would  otherwise  be unduly jeopardized  by the  mar-
ket system.  An assurance  that economic  failure need never preclude  a
fresh  start  is  easily  conceived  as  a condition  of  acceptance  of a  com-
petitive,  individualistic  economy;  and  even  in  the  natural-rights  tra-
dition  there  are  indications  that  persons  lacking  other  means  have  a
right to receive the necessities of life from those with means to spare.197
The  length  and  breadth  of  the  legal  order,  then,  may  well  be
seen  as  rights-infested.  Of  course  this  notion  is  not  the  only  way
in which the legal order can be understood; but it is a way no less rooted
in tradition,  and  no  less  intellectually  respectable,  than the  economic
approach.
198
Insofar  as  one  shares in the perception  of the widespread  infesta-
tion  of  statute  law  by  notions  of  rights,  an  interesting  consequence
ensues about which I shall have more to say in Part II.  There emerges
a  significant  connection between  voting  and litigating regarded  as  par-
ticipatory  mediums.  Each  is  an  activity  concerned  with  rights  and
boundaries.  Litigation  consummates  the  staking-out  of  boundaries
undertaken  at  the  legislative  stage.  There  is  something  sharply  jar-
ring  about  a  set  of  rules  which  firmly  inveighs  against  exclusion  of
persons  from  the  vote,  while  rather  freely  allowing  their  exclusion
from the litigation arena.
197.  See 1 W. BLACESTONE,  COMMENTARIS  *131;1.  LocKE, supra note 90, at 17.
198.  There  is  still  another,  intellectually  respectable  perspective  which  regards  the
entire  legislative  output  (including,  it would  seem,  any  forbearance  on  the part of  the
legislature  to  alter  the  common  law)  as  quite  lacking  in  any  organizing  purpose  or
direction.  Analysts  with this  viewpoint  see  legislation  as,  instead,  a  collection  of  out-
comes  of political  power plays,  unrelated  to one  another  except  insofar  as, taken  alto-
gether, they amount to  a politically  acceptable  compromise among  contending  interests.
See Kennedy,  supra note  185,  at 367-70.  In this perspective  it  can  well  be  said  that
the  laws  "have  no  spirit."  Id. at  383.  But  I  think we  can  ignore  the  spiritless-laws
position  because  no one  (so far as I  am  aware)  is yet  able to tell us how, from such  a
standpoint,  it would  be  possible  to  develop  an  intellectually  manageable  conception  of
what  interests  are  protected  by  the  due  process  clause.  Indeed,  there  is  reason  to
believe  that  a court  cannot  base  any  of its  reasoning  on  the  spiritless-laws  view,  be-
cause that view  makes it impossible for the  court to act  in the modes  that make its  ac-
tions  those  of  a  court  rather  than  of  a  legislature  or  some  other  kind  of  agent.
See id. at 396-98.
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